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FAMILY LAW: HUSBAND AND WIFE
by
Joseph W. MCKnight*

I. STATUS

tNFORMAL Marriage. Texas courts will strictly scrutinize the assertion of an informal marriage.' Once the marital relationship is estabit lished, however, the state's policy is to uphold a marriage against a
claim of invalidity unless it is clearly void or voidable. 2 In In re AL. 3 a
biological father appealed from a lower court judgment terminating his
parent-child relationship with two minor children. The father gave uncontroverted testimony that he and the now-deceased mother had agreed to be
husband and wife, that they had cohabited as such, and that they had represented themselves to others as married. The father, however, admitted
that his wife had been previously married. The appellate court held that
the presumption that the more recent marriage was valid overcame
any
4
inference of the continuance of the deceased wife's prior marriage.
Although Texas courts seek to protect the marital relationship, they do
not recognize the existence of "marriage" between persons of the same sex,
either with or without formalities.5 In that regard, a recent decision held
that an indictment for indecency with a child was not defective despite the
fact that it did not allege a nonspousal relationship between the defendant
and his male victim. 6 In a different context another court held that no
public policy considerations prevented a woman from bringing a suit to
recover realty and personalty she had acquired jointly with another woman during the course of a twelve year lesbian relationship. 7 Reversing a
summary judgment for the defendant, the court of appeals held that the
* B.A., The University of Texas; B.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia
University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. The author acknowledges
the assistance of Drew A. Campbell, third year student at Southern Methodist University
School of Law, in preparation of this Article.
1. Bodde v. Texas, 568 S.W.2d 344, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.

968 (1979). The reasoning in Standard v. Bledsoe, 633 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Ct. App.-Texarkana 1982, no writ) (couple who allegedly entered into agreement in Texas but cohabited
elsewhere) is far from clear.
2. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.01 (Vernon 1975).
3. 622 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).

4. Id at 661.
5. Slayton v. Texas, 633 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. Ct. App.-Forth Worth 1982, no writ).
6. Id The relevant statute did not apply to a child that was the spouse of the alleged
offender. Id at 938 (Hughes J., dissenting).
7. Small v. Harper, 638 S.W.2d 24, 28 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ
ref d n.r.e.).
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evidence was sufficient to suggest the existence of a partnership for profit
with the attendant right to recover property in proportion to the value of
8
labor contributed by each.
InterspousalTestimony. Code of Criminal Procedure section 38.11 defines
the marital communication privilege in providing that with some exceptions neither spouse may be a witness .against the other during the existence of the marriage regardless of whether the testimony reveals a
confidential communication. 9 Moreover, a person no longer married may
not testify to a confidential communication made to an ex-spouse during
the marital relationship unless the testimony extenuates or justifies the offense for which the witness's ex-spouse is on trial.' 0 In a recent criminal
case the defendant asserted on appeal that the trial judge had erred in
allowing testimony by his alleged common-law wife. " The court recognized that the privilege for confidential communications extends to informal marriages, but upon close scrutiny of the relationship, determined that
the defendant had failed to show a "present agreement" with his alleged
wife to be married. 12 The court concluded that to "agree on present cohabitation and future marriage" was not sufficient to prove a valid infor3
mal marriage.'
Federal courts have consistently held that communications by a spouse
who knows that a third person is present are not protected from disclosure
by the marital communication privilege.1 4 In a case of first impression a
federal district court in Colorado refused to apply the presence-of-a-thirdperson exception to telephone conversations between two spouses after the
husband's arrest.15 Federal agents taped the calls with the wife's acquiescence. The court held that absent a showing that the husband was aware
that a third person was listening to the conversation, the federal government could not rebut the presumption of confidentiality arising in the marital communication.' 6 Moreover, the wife's willingness to testify did not
abrogate the husband's privilege since he alone, as communicator, held the
17
privilege and the power to waive it.
8. Id at 27-28. The court analogized the instant situation to Hayworth v. Williams,
102 Tex. 308, 313-14, 116 S.W.43, 45-46 (1909) (putative spouses entitled to property in
proportion to efforts exerted during cohabitation).
9. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (Vernon 1979), where the exceptions are
specifically enumerated.
10. Id
11. Lackey v. Texas, 638 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
12. Id. at 443-44; see Bush v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 43, 46, 261 S.W.2d 158, 159-60
(1953) (common-law wife disqualified as a witness against her common-law husband).
13. 638 S.W.2d at 443-44 (citing Rosetta v. Rosetta, 525 S.W.2d 255, 261 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1975, no writ)); see also Hightower v. State, 629 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1982).
14. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954); Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14
(1934).
15. United States v. Neal, 532 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1982). This case provides an
excellent overview of the present status of marital privilege in federal cases.
16. Id. at 947.
17. Id (citing 8 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2340 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
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Workers' Compensation. The affirmative defense of abandonment involves the voluntary separation of one spouse from the other with the intention not to return to cohabit as husband and wife for the requisite
statutory period.' 8 In addition, the abandonment by one spouse must "be
neither caused, procured, nor consented to" by the nonabandoning
party.' 9 A Houston court of appeals held that because abandonment must
be affirmatively pled, a workers' compensation claimant need not incorporate in her pleadings allegations controverting the defense. 20 Thus, the
mere pleading by the liability carrier that the wife had abandoned the replaced no additional burden of pleading or proof on the
cipient husband
2
claimant. '
Groundsfor Divorce. The pre-1973 version of Family Code section 3.64
required that a decree of divorce or annulment be based on "full and satisfactory evidence," as previously provided in article 4632 of the Revised
Civil Statutes.22 The repeal of old section 3.64, however, was not intended
to change the burden of proof or to allow a petitioner to take a default
judgment without proof of grounds. 23 A dissenting opinion in Vallone v.
Vallone 24 confirmed this interpretation in a discussion of the liberal pleading requirements for divorce suits. Justice Sondock recognized that "no
true default judgment in a divorce suit" exists under Texas law;25 therefore, even in the event that a defendant fails to answer a plaintiff's petition,
evidence must be produced to warrant the granting of
full and satisfactory
26
a divorce.
II.

CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY

Community Presumption. In re Read 27 involved the use of separate funds
in developing community mineral interests. The Amarillo court of appeals
held that all the profits a husband derived from these activities were community property. 28 The use of separate property in the development or
18. Jackson v. Jackson, 470 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971, writ
refd n.r.e.).
19. Id. at 279 (quoting McGowen v. McGowen, 52 Tex. 657, 667 (1880)).
20. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Woody, 640 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [ist
Dist.] 1982, no writ).
21. Id; see Seale v. Nichols, 505 S.W.2d 251, 254 (Tex. 1974) (mere pleading of affirmative defense without more is insufficient to withstand summary judgment motion); Gulf,
Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. McBride, 159 Tex. 442, 453-54, 322 S.W.2d 492, 500 (1959) (plaintiff's

petition need not negative affirmative defense; defendant must make showing of facts supporting such defense).
22. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4632 (Vernon 1960) (current version TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. §§ 3.53, 3.60, 3.61, 3.64 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982-1983).
23. See McKnight, Texas Family Code andCommentary, Title P" Husbandand Wife, 13
TEX. TECH L. REV. 611, 693 (1982).
24. 644 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1983).

25. Id. at 467 (Sondock, J., dissenting).
26. Id
27. 634 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1982, writ dism'd w.o.j.).

28. Id. at 346 (citing Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 500-01, 260 S.W.2d 676, 682
(1953)).
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operation of the oil and gas interests did not change the community status
gave rise to an equitable right of reimbursement
of the property but only
29
in the separate estate.
In Vallone v. Vallone 30 the wife asserted that the trial court erred in not
considering the substantial contribution the community estate made to the
husband's separate corporate stock through the husband's expenditure of
time, toil, and talent in making the corporation productive. The majority
of the Texas Supreme Court declined to address the characterization issue,
however, and limited its decision to issues of pleading. 3' The dissenting
opinions of Justices Barrow and Sondock nevertheless make it abundantly
clear that the court must have discussed the proper characterization of the
stock's enhanced value. Indeed, the majority's limited discussion of the
pleadings regarding an alleged right of reimbursement seems to contain an
implicit (if tentative) rejection of the dissenting justices' analysis. 32 Justice
Sondock's vigorous dissent espouses the view that the increased value of
separately owned stock of a corporation to which the owner devoted virtually all of his time is community property and therefore is divisible on
divorce. 33 The trial court had concluded that the husband owned fortyseven percent of the stock as separate property and the remaining fiftythree percent as community. The court of appeals held that the trial
court's division of property constituted an abuse of discretion because the
court had ignored the enhancement in the value of the stock attributable to
community labor. 34 A majority of the supreme court found no abuse of
discretion by the trial judge, suggesting that the increase in the value of the
husband's stock remained his separate property. 35 The dissenting judges
rested their argument on the rule that all of the spouses' earnings during
marriage belong to the community, and hence they deemed it irrelevant
that the community was said to have been adequately compensated by the
$200,000 annual salary earned by the husband. 36 Moreover, the dissent
regarded the fact that the property involved was "cloaked in corporate
form" as inconsequential. Justice Sondock concluded, as in the case of a
separate sole proprietorship, that earnings from a separate corporation or
partnership produced by community energies should belong to the com29. 634 S.W.2d at 346.
30. 644 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1982). For a discussion of the appellate court opinion, see
McKnight, Family Law.- Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 97,
108, 141-42 (1982).
31. 634 S.W.2d at 458.
32. Id at 458-59.
33. Id at 461 (Sondock, J., joined by Pope, C.J., and McGee, J., dissenting). Justice
Barrow entered a separate dissenting opinion but also expressed his agreement with Justice
Sondock's dissent.
34. 618 S.W.2d 820, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981).
35. 644 S.W.2d at 460.
36. Id at 461 (Sondock, J., dissenting). The dissent suggests that the majority "finds
solace" in its determination that the community received adequate compensation, but holds
that all of the earnings, not just those deemed "adequate compensation," should be included
in the community estate. Id at 161.
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munity estate. 37 The issue in Vallone was not as clear-cut as it might have
been, however, because every time the separate estate was enhanced by
forty-seven percent, the community estate was enhanced by fifty-three percent, and, as the majority noted, "[m]any of the couple's personal transac''38
tions were handled through the corporation.
Prior to the supreme court's disposition of Vallone, the Tyler court of
appeals in Jensen v. Jensen3 9 characterized the enhancement in value of a
husband's separate corporate stock as community property divisible on divorce. 4° Prior to marriage the husband had acquired a significant block of
shares in a closely held corporation. 4' During the next four years the value
of the stock greatly increased as a result of the husband's efforts. In her
suit for divorce the wife claimed that the enhanced value of the stock belonged to the community estate. The trial court concluded that the husband had been adequately and reasonably compensated through salary,
dividends, and bonuses 42 and that the community was not entitled to receive the value of the appreciation in the shares. 43 The appellate court
declined to address the issue of the community's reasonable compensation
and concluded that the weight of authority suggests that the enhanced
value of corporate stock, even when due to the efforts of one spouse,
should be attributable to the community estate."4 The court indicated that
the trial court's mischaracterization of the shares substantially altered the
way the trial court would have divided the estate if properly characterized
and constituted reversible error. 4 5 In Jensen the Texas Supreme Court will
have before it a clear case for testing Justice Sondock's hypothesis.
The Fort Worth court of appeals in Martin v. Martin46 recognized that a
family corporation is a separate entity, the assets of which are not ordinarily to be included in the community estate upon division in a divorce
37. Id at 463-64. The Sondock dissent cited numerous Texas cases holding tha; the
increase in value of a separate business is community property when attributable to the
spouse's operation of the business during the marriage. Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661,
662 (Tex. 1976) (military retirement case); Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 396 (Tex.
1972) (personal injury case); Moss v. Gibbs, 370 S.W.2d 452, 454-55 (Tex. 1963) (case dealing with the wife's earnings and their investment); Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 500-01,
260 S.W.2d 676, 682 (1953) (aggregate partnership case); Epperson v. Jones, 65 Tex. 425, 428
(1886) (a case dealing with the profits derived from the wife's business).
38. 644 S.W.2d at 457.
39. 629 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1982, writ granted).
40. Id at 224.
41. The husband owned 48.5% of the stock as separate property and controlled another
2% as trustee.
42. The findings that related to adequacy of compensation were in response to the wife's
contention that the community was entitled to the difference between her husband's actual
compensation and the compensation the community would have received if he had been
adequately compensated.
43. The court further found that the corporation was not the alter ego of the husband,
and on appeal the wife did not contend otherwise.
44. 629 S.W.2d at 224. The court cited 3 0. SPEER, TEXAS FAMILY LAW § 15:50, at 115
(5th ed. 1975), Logan v. Logan, 112 S.W.2d 515, 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1937, writ
dism'd), and a student comment.
45. 629 S.W.2d at 226.
46. 628 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
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case. 47 In Martin a motor freight line was purchased during marriage, and
thus the shares were presumed to belong to the community. The trial court
valued the entire community property, including the corporation, at approximately $114,000 and on division, awarded the wife 56.5 percent of the
estate. The court ordered that the wife's community interest in corporate
stock be transferred to the husband, and the husband assumed all of the
corporation's liabilities. 48 The husband was also required to execute a
promissory note of $18,000 to the wife, secured by a lien on the assets in
the corporation. The appellate court remanded the case because the trial
court had treated the corporation as the alter ego of the husband.4 9 The
court found no justification in the trial record for failing to regard the corporation as a discrete entity and for "piercing the corporate veil." 50 Moreover, the court held that a justified application of the alter ego doctrine
"does not necessarily mean that the alter ego is invested with the owner'S
ship of the corporate property even in part, certainly not in totality."'
The lower court, therefore, had erred in dividing the property without
properly ascertaining the community estate to be divided, and the $18,000
referable to the estate to
note the husband executed "could not be deemed
52
be divided" without further findings of fact.
Tracing and Commingling. If a party asserting the separate character of
particular property can trace the property to a separate source, the community presumption is rebutted. 53 In Vallone the trial and appellate courts
also addressed the tracing issue in characterizing the stock of a closely held
corporation. 54 The courts determined that the husband received the assets
of the business, valued at $9,365, as a gift from his father. The husband
then incorporated the business, transferring these assets and approximately
$10,000 of community property in exchange for all the stock. The intermediate appellate court rejected the wife's argument that the husband must
continue to trace those transferred assets after incorporation in order to
show that a part of the shares were separate property. 55 The majority of
the Texas Supreme Court did not discuss the tracing issue, but the dissent47. Id at 535.
48. The corporation was not, however, made a party to the suit.
49. Id. at 534.

50. Id at 535 (citing Duke v. Duke, 605 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1980, writ dism'd) (corporate entity can only be disregarded when used to perpetrate fraud
or justify a wrong)); Humphrey v. Humphrey, 593 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ dism'd) (separateness of corporation must have ceased and "adherence to the fiction of the separate existence of the corporation would sanction a fraud or
promote injustice"). The court might also have cited Goetz v. Goetz, 567 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ) (corporate entity cannot be disregarded unless corporation
used to defraud creditors, circumvent a statute, protect crimes, or perpetuate a monopoly).
51. 628 S.W.2d at 535.
52. Id at 536.
53. Tarver v. Tarver, 394 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Tex. 1965); Schmidt v. Huppmann, 73 Tex.
112, 115, 11 S.W. 175, 176 (1881).
54. 618 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981); see McKnight, supra
note 30, at 108 (discussing the lower courts' disposition of Vallone).
55. 618 S.W.2d at 822-23.
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ing justices adopted the wife's argument. 56 The dissenters argued that "the
husband made no attempt to trace the increase in his separate property,
either in specie, through mutation, or by keeping detailed business
records."' 57 They further argued that, in this case, the lower appellate court
had treated the simple act of incorporation as a substitute for the tracing
requirement.5 8 The minority of the court suggested that "the majority
ha[d] created an option of election for a spouse, who by a simple ex parte
paper transaction will be able to transform community earnings into separate property." 59 Because the business continued to be run like a sole proprietorship after incorporation, 60 the dissent treated the corporation as 6a1
mere instrumentality for the conduct of the husband's business affairs,
that is as the husband's alter ego without so designating it.
The husband in In re Read62 unsuccessfully attempted to trace premarital income from certain separate oil and gas leases, as well as the separate
funds used to develop them. In examining the trial record the Amarillo
court of appeals found substantial commingling of separate and community funds, without a detailed record of either expenditures or deposits to
distinguish them. 63 The husband had deposited income from oil and gas
rights acquired before and after marriage in the same account but failed to
relate those deposits to disbursements from the same account. The court
held that this was a necessary requisite to proper tracing and identification
of his separate property. 6'
56. 644 S.W.2d at 464 (Sondock, J., dissenting). The dissent cited Hardee v. Vincent,
136 Tex. 99, 102, 147 S.W.2d 1072, 1074 (Tex. 1941) (burden on spouse to trace separate
character of stock of merchandise and fixtures in family business); Blumer v. Kallison, 297
S.W.2d 898, 900-01 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (separate property
could be identified by "modern and accurate" bookkeeping methods).
57. 644 S.W.2d at 465.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. The dissent noted the following observation of the intermediate appellate court:
There is little doubt that in many respects the financial and business end of the
corporation was operated with great informality. Cash was taken from the
business when it was needed for personal expenses; neither officer nor directors' meetings were held on a regular basis; and the corporation was run by the
husband, rather than by its officers or a board of directors.
Id. at 465 (citing 618 S.W.2d at 824).
61. 644 S.W.2d at 466 (citing Dillingham v. Dillingham, 434 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ dism'd)).
Texas adopted the Uniform Partnership Act in 1961. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
6132b (Vernon 1970). The majority of the Act treats a partnership as an entity distinct from
its partners, with some exceptions, e.g., the aggregate notion of joint and several liability.
Id. § 15. Because Texas law recognizes the independent existence of a partnership for most
purposes, by analogy a legislative intent can be shown that a corporation should remain
wholly independent of its shareholders. The Vallone dissenters refused to acknowledge the
entity concept and insisted upon treating the husband and his closely held corporation as
indistinguishable.
62. 634 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1982, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
63. Id. at 348. The court found that the husband's records were insufficient to discharge
his burden of tracing by clear and satisfactory evidence. Id (citing Wilson v. Wilson, 145
Tex. 607, 610, 201 S.W.2d 226, 227-(1947)).
64. 634 S.W.2d 347 (citing Latham v. Allison, 560 S.W.2d 481, 485 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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The dispute in Grimsley v. Grimsley65 focused on a letter that the husband had written to the wife shortly before their marriage. In it the husband related that he was giving her an extensive list of real and personal
property. Shortly after their marriage the spouses purchased a home with
a down payment from the proceeds of the sale of assets that were included
in the premarital letter. On divorce the district court awarded the home
and several items of listed real and personal property to the wife as her
separate property. The court attempted to determine whether the husband
had made a gift of all of the assets to his wife prior to marriage, thus making the down payment for the home a part of her separate estate. The
court of appeals held that the attempted gift of the husband's realty could
be accomplished only by deed or by showing (1) a present gift, (2) possession by the donee with the donor's consent, and (3) the donee's having
made valuable improvements. 66 The court found none of these prerequisites satisfied. Moreover, the purported gift of the personalty was invalid
67
because the husband never relinquished total dominion and control.
The husband was therefore entitled to a separate property interest in the
68
house to the extent his separate property was used as the downpayment.
It is not stated in whose name title to the house was taken, and the court
did not discuss the presumption of an interspousal gift when the husband's
separate property is used to 69purchase property with title taken wholly or
partially in the wife's name.
III.

MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY

Interspousal Transfers. In Daubert v. United States 70 the executors of a
decedent's estate sought to have the deceased spouse's community interest
in the proceeds of a $75,000 life insurance policy excluded from his taxable
estate. The executors alleged that the husband made a gift of his community interest to his wife at the time the policy was purchased by buying it in
her name as owner. The court held that to effect a gift of the policy the
donor must "perform an affirmative act which would clearly reflect an intention to make a gift" of community interest. 7' The federal court sup65. 632 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
66. Id at 178 (citing Moody v. Ireland, 456 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco

1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). The court noted that in the absence of improvements the gift may
nevertheless be enforced if it would work a fraud on the donee to do otherwise. Id
67. 632 S.W.2d at 179. The court found that the husband's corporation had $20,000 in a
savings account and that he never relinquished control of the passbook nor transferred the

account into the wife's name. The corporate stock allegedly given to the wife was never
endorsed over to her nor did the husband ever give up possession of the shares. Id at 17879. One would have thought, however, that the delivery of the letter would have sufficed
under the circumstances to constitute a constructive delivery of the items of personalty
enumerated.
68. Id. at 179.
69. See Smith v. Strahan, 16 Tex. 314, 321 (1856) (presumption of gift when one spouse
purchases property with separate funds to which title is taken in name of other spouse);
Powell v. Jackson, 320 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1958, writ ret'd n.r.e.) (presumption of gift arises when one spouse conveys separate property to other spouse).
70. 533 F. Supp. 66 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
71. Id at 69 (quoting Freedman v. United States, 382 F.2d 742, 747 (5th Cir. 1967)).
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ported this conclusion by reference to the husband's continued control of
the policy and the argument that designation of the wife as the policy owner did not constitute a "clear and conscious choice" reflecting donative
intent. 72 A purchase with community property in the name of either
spouse does not change its character. If the purchase was intended to belong to the wife, she should have been designated not merely as its owner
but it should have been stated to be her separate property. 73 The federal
court imposed a very strict standard of proof.
A trustee sought to set aside a bankrupt's transfer of property to his wife
inAdams v. Wilhite.74 In November 1977 the Wilhites executed a buy-sell
agreement in which the husband transferred ownership in a dairy business
to his wife. The agreement recited that the husband was no longer able to
pay his business debts and that he would transfer all assets and liabilities
to his wife. Moreover, the document noted that the wife had used her
separate funds to operate the business for over a month and would continue to do so under the terms of the agreement. In March 1978 the husband filed a bankruptcy petition and the trustee objected to his discharge,
alleging that the transfer of his property to Mrs. Wilhite was intended to
defraud his creditors. The bankruptcy court overruled the trustee's objections and held that the transfer of property to the wife was not an attempt
to defraud the husband's creditors. For some mysterious reason the trustee
had not initially attempted to set aside the transfer to the wife in the bankruptcy court. A month later, however, he filed suit in state court for that
purpose. He alleged that the transfer was made without fair or adequate
consideration and with the intent to hinder, delay, and defraud the debtorhusband's creditors. The trustee further alleged that the transferred property remained in the possession of the husband and that the wife knew of
the husband's attempt to defraud his creditors. The trial court rejected the
wife's argument that the fraudulent conveyance issue had been litigated in
the prior bankruptcy proceeding and that the trustee should be estopped
from asserting it collaterally. The jury found that the husband had intended to defraud his creditors in the transfer of property to his wife, but
that the wife acquired the property with adequate consideration and without notice of the husband's fraudulent intent. 75 The trial court entered a
take-nothing judgment against the trustee. On appeal the trustee urged
that the weight of the evidence suggested that the wife's knowledge of her
husband's financial status put her on notice of his intent to defraud his
creditors. Under Texas law a transfer may be set aside if the purchaser
72. 533 F. Supp. at 71.
73. Id at 70-71 (citing Freedman v. United States, 382 F.2d 742, 747 n.9 (5th Cir. 1967);
Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank, 306 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1957, no
writ).
74. 636 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler), rev'dper curiam, 640 S.W.2d 875 (Tex.

1982).
75. The jury also found that the wife had made payments on the purchase price of a
tract of land included in the transfer, that she had made improvements on the land with her
separate funds; and that she made the improvements in good faith and with the belief that
the land was her separate property.
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knows or should have known of a seller's fraudulent intent, even when
valuable consideration is paid.76 The trustee argued that several badges of
fraud compelled the inference that the wife must have had such notice.
The court noted that the wife knew of her husband's financial plight and
that she failed to inventory the property she had purchased. These facts
coupled with the parties' close relationship prompted the appellate court to
find that the evidence was sufficient to charge the transferee-wife with notice, and the cause was accordingly remanded. 77 In a per curiam decision
the Texas Supreme Court granted the wife's writ of error. 78 The court held
that the issue of fraudulent conveyance had been litigated in the original
bankruptcy proceeding and that the lower courts erred in overruling the
plea of collateral estoppel. 79 The court further concluded that while the
trustee had raised the "intent to defraud" issue in the trial court, his failure
to request submission of a special issue on the intent to "hinder and delay"
resulted in a waiver of any recovery under either claim.8 0 The court affirmed the trial court decision8 without addressing the appellate court's
finding of constructive notice. '
82
Disposition of Solely Managed Community Property. In Spruill v. Spruill
the trial court found that the husband had created a false community debt
in order to defraud his wife of her community interest in stock held in the
husband's name. During their marriage the husband had conducted his
business through a solely owned corporation and four other corporations
in which he and a business associate each owned a fifty percent interest.
All of the couple's ordinary living expenses were paid from corporate accounts. About the time the wife filed for divorce the husband's businesses
declined, and he executed a series of promissory notes totalling $358,000 to
his business associate. The notes were secured by a pledge of his stock in
the four corporations. The associate promptly filed suit in New Orleans to
foreclose on all the husband's corporate stock. Although the associate's
judgment completely wiped out the community estate, the husband remained on friendly terms with the associate and continued acting as president of one of the corporations at an annual salary of $12,000. The trial
court found that the husband's wholly owned corporation was his alter ego
and that the stock was pledged to defraud the wife of her community interest. As a result the trial court awarded the wife all the husband's interest
in the corporate stock as well as all the companies' corporate records and
personal property. The court also awarded the wife the family home and
$30,000 to reimburse her for community funds expended on the husband's
paramour. On review the appellate court affirmed the trial court's division
76. 636 S.W.2d at 855; see TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. art. 24.02 (Vernon 1968).
77. 636 S.W.2d at 856.

78. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 63 (Oct. 27, 1982).

79. Id.
80. Id at 64.
81. Id at 63-64.
82. 624 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1981, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
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and rejected the husband's assertion that the wife's knowledge of the
$30,000 community expenditure constituted a defense to any constructive
fraud of the wife's rights. 83 The court noted the judicial disfavor of "gifts
by the husband to 'strangers' of the marriage, particularly of the female
84
variety."
Post-Divorce Liability. In Smart v. Crawford Building Material Co. 8 a
creditor sued both spouses to recover on a debt they incurred during their
marriage. During construction of what was to be the couple's future home,
the husband set up a charge account with Crawford and charged construction materials over the course of a six month period. The outstanding balance increased to almost $3,000, and Crawford added a service charge to
the unpaid account of $50 during the two months following nonpayment.
Before the couple paid the balance they were divorced. The spouses' property settlement agreement required the husband to assign to his wife any
usury claim he might have relative to the interest charged on the Crawford
account. The wife, in turn, agreed to indemnify her husband for any indebtedness attributable to the home construction. The husband agreed to
quitclaim his interest in the home to his wife, and she was required to sell
the home and to place the amount owed to Crawford in an escrow account.
After the divorce Crawford sued both spouses for the principal amount
of the debt, but did not seek the service charges earlier imposed. The exwife answered with a general denial and filed a cross-action for usury pursuant to the settlement agreement. The trial court awarded Crawford a
judgment against the ex-husband for the entire indebtedness, rendered a
take-nothing judgment against the ex-wife, and denied her usury claim.
On appeal the former wife argued that the trial court erroneously denied
her usury claim in failing to find her to be an obligor on the Crawford
account, a necessary prerequisite for bringing such an action. 86 The Tyler
court of appeals rejected her appeal on two grounds. The court held first
that there was no community debt because the husband had acted alone in
setting up the account and had received all delivery tickets, invoices, and
statements pertinent to the account.8 7 The court therefore concluded that
the debt owed was "not a community debt or joint obligation of both the
83. Id. at 698.
84. Id at 697 (citing Quilliam, Gratuitous Transfers of Community Property to Third
Persons, 2 TEX. TECH L. REV. 23, 43-44 (1970)). On the other hand, if there is no conflict of
interest in a county officer's receiving a salary from the county, none arises from the officer's
spouse being so employed. Thus the attorney general ruled that a husband as county commissioner does not violate his oath against being interested in contractual dealings with the
county if his wife is a salaried employee of the county. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. OP.W-438 (1982).
85. 638 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ).
86. Under Texas law a cause of action for usury is personal to the obligor and nonassignable. Id at 230 n.1.
87. Id at 230. The court cited LeBlanc v. Waller, 603 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ) for the rule that the community debt presumption can be
overcome by sufficient evidence. The court's reliance was misplaced, however, because LeBlanc involved the transfer of spousal control of community property pursuant to an agreement between the spouses under § 5.22 of the Family Code. See McKnight, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, Family Law: Husband & Wife, 34 Sw. L.J. 115, 128-29 (1980).
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husband and the wife."' 88 Hence, the ex-wife could not have been the obligor on the Crawford account. 89 The court further held that because a
usury action is in the nature of a penalty, Texas law limits recovery to the
obligor. 90 Consequently, no assignee can maintain an action for usury. 91
Much of the judicial discussion of "community debt" is based on the
erroneous supposition that all "community debts" are equally shared by
the spouses whether they are both makers of the debt or not. That supposition is not warranted by the basic principles of Texas law. Apart from
the context of acquiring necessaries, debt incurred by only one spouse does
not affect the other spouse at all except that it makes the nonobligated
spouse's share of community property liable for payment if the property
sought for payment is subject to the sole or joint management of the
92
spouse who incurs the debt.
Anderson v. Royce 93 involved the community debt argument as well as a
seeming corollary of fraudulent-transfer law. The husband co-signed a
third person's promissory note as an accommodation maker. The holder
of the note brought suit against both spouses after their divorce. Reversing
the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the ex-wife, the
court of appeals reiterated the holding that community property reachable
during marriage remains liable after divorce and partition of the community estate.94 The wife argued that because she was not a party to the
written contract, her liability was governed by section 5.61, which defines
the liability of spouses for debts incurred during marriage. 95 She also contended that the debt, if any, should be governed by the two year statute of
limitations then in effect for unwritten debts rather than the four year limit
applicable to written debts. 96 The court of appeals rejected this argument
88. 638 S.W.2d at 230. The court apparently thought that a "community debt" and a
"joint obligation" are the same thing. Clearly they are not.
89 .

d

90. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); see Houston
Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex. 1979) (construing art. 5069-1.06).
91. 638 S.W.2d at 220 (citing Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217, 222
(Tex. 1979); South E. Xpress, Inc. v. Bank of Crowley, 612 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.c.)).
92. TEX. FAM CODE ANN. § 5.61 (Vernon 1975). In Donald R. Klein & Assoc. v. Klein,
637 S.W.2d 507, 508 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1982, no writ), it was urged that because the
contract of one spouse constituted a "community obligation," suit could not be maintained
against the surviving spouse but had to be brought against the deceased spouse's estate or
joinder of the decedent's estate was required. Both arguments were summarily rejected. Id
93. 624 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
94. Id. at 623 (citing Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 171 (Tex. 1975); Inwood Nat'l Bank v. Hoppe, 596 S.W.2d 183, 185-86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)). For a criticism of Hoppe, see McKnight, Family Law Husband and Wfe, AnnualSurvey of Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 93 (198 1); see also Wall v. Wall, 630 S.W.2d 493, 49697 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (wife held liable on two promissory
notes signed only by husband). Cockerham does not support the proposition, but other authorities do support it. See McKnight, Division of Texas MaritalProperty on Divorce, 8 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 413, 474 n.361 (1976); Comment, BankruptcyAfter Divorce.: Rights and Liabilities of Former Spouses in Texas, 23 Sw. L.J. 173, 184-85 (1982).
95. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61 (Vernon 1975).
96. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5527, § I (Vernon 1958) (amended 1979). Prior to

1979 a two-year statute of limitation was applicable to debts not evidenced by a contract in
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and found that section 5.61 was merely a codification of Spanish and Mexican law prior to 1840 and to common law thereafter. 97 So construed, the
wife's liability, arising not from statute but rather "from the community
nature of the debt based upon a contract in writing," was held subject to
the four-year limitation governing contract actions. 98
It is high time that the community debt argument be put to rest. The
phrase "community debt" has long been useful in characterizing borrowed
money or property that a spouse buys on credit. If the lender or seller does
not specifically look to the borrower's or buyer's separate property for payment, it is clear that a community debt has been incurred, and thus that the
money borrowed or property bought is community property. But to take
the phrase out of this context, as well as to say that the designation of such
a debt as "community" makes both spouses liable for it (when only one of
them has contracted it), is clearly contrary to the express terms of section
5.61. Under Texas law as amended and recodified in 1969, a community
debt means nothing more than that some community property is liable for
its satisfaction.9 9 A community debt may at the same time be a separate
debt, unless the creditor agrees to seek satisfaction from community property only. Hence when the creditor has not agreed to limit recovery from
one marital estate or the other, he may proceed against either for satisfaction. Confining the term community debt to its traditional characterization context would remove a great source of confusion and discourage the
tendency of some courts to find separate debts where a section 5.61 community debt was clearly intended by the parties concerned.10°
But a more disciplined use of the term community debt does not solve
both problems raised inAnderson v. Royce, which does not rest directly on
the community debt misnomer, but on the notion that property a creditor
could have reached during marriage can likewise be reached after divorce.
The latter aspect of Anderson was partially addressed by the Texas
Supreme Court in Stewart Title Co. v. Huddleston. 101 The court held that a
creditor of one former spouse must first secure a judgment against the
writing. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon 1958) (amended 1979). All debts are
presently governed by a four-year statute of limitation. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
527 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). Because of this change, this portion of Anderson is of no
further practical significance.
97. It is neither. See Recommended Revision and Commentary of the Drafting Committee (art. 4620) 14-15 (1967). For the Hispano-Mexican law, see Pugh, The Spanish Community of Gains in 1803: Sociedad de Gananciales, 30 LA. L. REV. 1, 17-29 (1969); for the
pre-1968 law, see McKnight, Liability of Separate and Community Propertyfor Obligations of
Spouses to Strangers, in CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS 330, 333, 338 (. McKnight ed. 1963).
98. 624 S.W.2d at 623.

99. See McKnight, Family Law- Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28
Sw. L.J. 66, 81-82 (1974) [hereinafter cited as McKnight, 1974 Annual Survey]; see also McKnight, supra note 30, at 117; McKnight, supra note 94, at 114-16; McKnight, Family Law:
Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas law, 32 Sw. L.J. 109, 138-39 (1978).
100. See Brazosport Bank v. Robertson, 616 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-1981, writ
dism'd w.o.j.); Mortenson v. Trammell, 604 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi

1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
101. 598 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio), writ refd n.r.e per curiam, 608
S.W.2d 611 (Tex. 1980).
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owner of the property sought to be seized in satisfaction of the marital debt
incurred by the other. 10 2 Necessarily, the community debt argument will
be raised by the creditor in attempting to secure the requisite judgment.
But if a nonobligor, former spouse is to be held liable for the other's debt
merely because the nonobligor has received property on divorce that
would have been subject to satisfaction of the debt during marriage, the
court must hold that a transfer by one spouse to the other in anticipation of
divorce or by order of the divorce court is prima facie fraudulent if the
creditor need not prove fraudulent intent of the transferor or his resulting
insolvency. When it is considered that a gift by one spouse to the other is
not prima facie fraudulent, surely a transfer in the divorce context is not
SO.
The 1981 amendment to article XVI, section 15 of the Texas Constitution, allowing spouses to partition their community property "without the
intention to defraud pre-existing creditors,"' 0 3 was designed to allow
spouses a means of precluding unsecured creditors' reliance on those authorities allowing satisfaction of one spouse's debts from property that
might have been reached prior to its partition on divorce to the other
spouse. Thus a partition made by spouses in anticipation of divorce is
clearly within the constitutional provision. 1°4 It may be cogently argued
that if spouses can make such a partition, the divorce court should be able
to do so for them, with the same effect, when they cannot agree. A court
might thus prevent application of those authorities the amendment was
designed to limit. A creditor who has failed to assert his claim to property
during marriage or to intervene in the divorce should be later foreclosed
from pursuing it in the hands of the debtor's former spouse, unless the
circumstances of the property division shows an intent to defraud the cred5
itor as in Steed v. Bost.

0

Liability Under FederalLaw. A number of federal tax cases have reaffirmed the rule that each spouse living under a community property regime is subject to taxation on his or her share of community income. 106
One tax court decision held that under federal tax law as applied to Texas
community property doctrine, each spouse is liable for payment on his or
102. The intermediate appellate court in Huddleston had held that a divorce decree does
not diminish or limit the rights of creditors to proceed against either or both spouses for
debts incurred prior to divorce. 598 S.W.2d at 323.
103. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
104. See McKnight, The ConstitutionalRedfnition of Texas MatrimonialPropertyAs It
Affects Antenuptial and Interspousal Transactions, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 449, 473-74 (1982).
For a comment on the law under the prior constitutional provision, see McKnight, 1974
Annual Survey, supra note 99, at 82.
105. 602 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ). In Steed the court found
fraudulent intent. A division on divorce that makes a debtor insolvent may be covered by
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.03 (Vernon 1968). In the case of a marriage dissolved
by death, TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 45 (Vernon 1980) provides specifically that "the community estate passes charged with the debts against it."
106. See e.g., Beatty v. Commissioner, 676 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1982); Alma J. Smith v.
Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1982-140, at 826; Roy M. Cline v. Commissioner, 43
T.C.M. (CCH) 1982-44, at 439.
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7
her respective share even if the couple has been permanently separated. 10
Furthermore, the overpayment of tax by one spouse filing separately cannot offset the deficiency of the other. The tax court sustained the Commissioner's deficiency assessment in another case when the wife filed
separately as a married person and included only her annual earnings as
her gross income.' 0 8 The court determined that she must add the community income of both spouses together and then declare one-half of the total
on her separate return as gross income taxable to her.'0 9 Conversely, when
a husband filed separately and attempted to deduct losses from his income
attributable to a community interest in his wife's limited partnership, the
Fifth Circuit disallowed the deduction entirely, saying that community
property laws did not "wipe out the distinction between husband and wife,
nor . . . erase valid transactions made by one spouse." 0
The tax court misconstrued the weight of Texas law in Jones v. Commissioner I ' in holding that a separated couple could not agree to allocate2
their income as separate property and file their tax returns accordingly." 1
After their separation the couple entered into an agreement providing that
their respective incomes would remain separate property. The husband's
tax returns for 1975 and 1976 failed to include his estranged wife's income.
The Internal Revenue Service determined that the agreement was invalid
under Texas law and included a portion of the wife's earnings in the husband's taxable income. The tax court affirmed the deficiency determination based upon the principle that Texas does not allow its community
property laws to be altered by contractual agreement.' 13 The court recognized the amendment to section 5.42 allowing the partition of community
property, but found that its effective date in 1981 rendered it inapplicable
to the spouses' agreement entered into in 1974.'14 The court overlooked
the line of Texas authority holding that estranged couples could agree to
forego the application of community property principles to their subsequent acquisitions." 5
A recent United States Supreme Court decision outside the family law
area suggested a question regarding divorced spouses' liability for mortgage indebtedness arising from the lender's exercise of a due-on-sale
clause. In Fidelity FederalSavings & Loan v. de la Cuesta 116 the appellees

107. Roy M. Cline v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1982-44, at 439 (citing Hunt v.
Commissioner, 22 T.C. 228, 231 (1954)).
108. Alma J. Smith v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1982-140, at 826.
109. Id at 827.
110. Laney v. Commissioner, 674 F.2d 342, 347 (5th Cir. 1982). The court cited no Texas
authority to support its assertion.
111. 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1982-277, at 1418.
112. Id.
113. Id The court cited Texas Bldg. & Mortgage Co. v. Rosenbaum, 159 S.W.2d 554
(1942), aft'd, 140 Tex. 325, 167 S.W.2d 506 (1943); Robbins v. Robbins, 125 S.W.2d 666, 670
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1939, no writ).
114. 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1982-277, at 1418 n.5.
115. See McKnight, Division of Texas MaritalProperly on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J.
413, 419-20 (1976).
116. 102 S.Ct. 3014, 73 L. Ed. 2d 664 (1982).

SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 37

had purchased property subject to a mortgage in favor of the appellant
savings and loan association. The loan agreement had a due-on-sale
clause providing that if the property was sold without prior notice to the
lender, the lender might treat the loan as due in full. The borrower sold
the property to the appellees without giving notice to the lender, who responded by demanding payment in full. When the borrower failed to
make the payment, the lender instituted foreclosure proceedings against
the buyers, who argued that the exercise of the due-on-sale clause violated
state judicial precedent that limited a lender's right to enforce such a
clause to situations when the lender could show that the transfer unreasonably impaired its security." 7 The Supreme Court found, however, that
section 5(a) of the Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933118 empowered the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board to prescribe regulations governing savings and loan associations." 19 One such regulation provided that a federal
savings and loan association "continues to have the power to include...
in its loan instrument" a due-on-sale clause.' 20 The court held that under
the preemption doctrine the federal regulation authorizing due-on-sale
clauses superseded the inconsistent state law principles restricting federal
savings and loan associations from using such provisions in loan
instruments. 121
Because the holding permits federal savings and loan associations to exercise due-on-sale clauses upon transfer of the mortgaged property without
the lender's consent, many family lawyers questioned whether a division of
property on divorce constituted a sale and thus triggered a due-on-sale
clause. In apparent response to the Court's holding in de la Cuesta, Congress amended the Home Owner's Loan Act to achieve effective preemption of state laws that prohibit due-on-sale clauses in mortgages.' 22 But
the amendment specifically provides that a lender may not exercise its option pursuant to a due-on-sale clause in the event of a transfer "resulting
from a decree of dissolution of marriage, legal separation agreement, or
from an incidental property settlement agreement, by which the spouse of
' 23
the borrower becomes an owner of the property."'
Homestead- Nature of the Interest. Although the historical development of
Texas homestead law has not produced a clear definition of its character, it
is sometimes likened to an estate in land rather than a mere exemption
from creditors' claims. 124 Two recent decisions considered the nature of a
117. The borrowers relied upon Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582

P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
118. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
119. 102 S. Ct. at 3018, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 670.
120. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1982).
121. 102 S. Ct. at 3025, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 678-79.
122. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 341,

96 Stat. 1469, 1505.
123. Id at 1506.
124. See McKnight, supra note 30, at 120-21; see also United States v. Rogers, 649 F.2d
1117, 1127 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 1748, 72 L. Ed. 2d 160 (1982). For an
account of the early history of the institution, see McKnight, Protection ofthe Famiy Home
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surviving spouse's interest in a homestead. In Fiew v. Qualtrough'25 the
spouses entered into a mutual will vesting the survivor with a life estate in
the eighty-five acre community homestead with the remainder in the
couple's niece. The will was probated on the husband's death. On the
niece's death the widow wrote a new will making no mention of the homestead estate and thereafter conveyed her undivided one-half interest in the
property to Fiew. On the widow's death the niece's heirs brought suit to
recover her interest in the realty. The trial court held that the spouses'
original will was "joint, mutual, and contractual," vesting a life estate in
the surviving wife and a remainder in the niece. The court further found
that the conveyance was subject to a constructive trust in favor of the
niece's heirs. On appeal Fiew asserted that the alleged contractual will
giving the surviving spouse a life estate was without consideration because
the wife was "already entitled to the use and occupancy of the tract for the
126
remainder of her life as part of her Constitutional homestead rights,"'
that is, that the widow's right did not rest on the contract but was already
possessed. 127 The court rejected this argument and found that the homestead right was "not a life estate in the pure sense of that term"; rather it
"'Partakes of the nature of an estate for life. .... ""128 It remains of such
nature only so long as the property retains its homestead character and can
therefore be lost through abandonment. 129 Hence, the widow's homestead
rights were not indefeasibly vested as were those in the life estate contractually created through the mutual will. The court concluded that "[w]hile
the two ran concurrently, it is obvious that she received an estate in the
land as a result of the will to which her Constitutional homestead rights
'
would not have entitled her. 130

The Amarillo court of appeals in Hill v. Hill13 1 commented on the nature of the homestead right in an attempt to determine the duties and liabilities arising therefrom. On the death of her husband the widow brought
suit to have a homestead set aside for her continued occupancy. The
couple's home was the separate property of her deceased husband subject
to a valid mortgage. The husband's executors had paid insurance, taxes,
and interest on the mortgage since the husband's death and sought reimbursement from the surviving spouse. The trial court ordered the wife to
reimburse the estate for these payments. The wife did not contest the payment of taxes, but appealed the order to pay for the insurance and the
from Seizure by Creditors.- The Sources and Evolution f a Legal Principle, 86 Sw. HIST. Q.

369 (1983).

125. 624 S.W.2d 335, 336 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
126. Id
127. The appellant relied upon Hill v. Aldrich, 242 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1951, writ dism'd).
128. 624 S.W.2d at 337 (quoting Jones v. Dewbre, 13 S.W.2d 233, 234 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1928, no writ) (emphasis in original)).
129. 624 S.W.2d at 337; see Rancho Oil Co. v. Powell, 142 Tex. 63, 68, 175 S.W.2d 960,
963 (1943); Sparks v. Robertson, 203 S.W.2d 622, 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ
ref'd).
130. 624 S.W.2d at 337.
131. Hill v. Hill, 623 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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interest on the mortgage. The court of appeals held that the homestead
"contain[ed] every element of a life estate" and thus analogized the wife's
duties and liabilities to those of a life tenant. 32 Her obligations therefore
included preservation of the estate by paying interest on the existing encumbrance. She was not, however, required to benefit the remaindermen
by making payments toward retirement of the principal, nor was she
bound to keep the property insured for protection of their future
interests. 33
Homestead- Designation and Extent. Prior to the 1973 amendment to the
Texas Constitution the homestead exemption extended only to the family,:
to the single adult acting as head of the family, or to the surviving family
constituent.' 34 The availability of the homestead protection necessarily
turned on the existence of a family relationship, so the divorce of a childless couple terminated the existence of the homestead. 135 The 1973
amendment recognized, and the statute now provides, that the exemption
extends to "a single, adult person, not a constituent of a family. 1 36 The
creation of the single-adult homestead thus obviates the cessation of the
homestead upon divorce of a childless couple when one spouse continues
to maintain the property as a homestead. 37 In Renaldo v. Bank of San
8
Antonio 13
the Texas Supreme Court determined that prior to the amendment creating a single-adult homestead, a possessory conservator of a child
could establish a family homestead as a single parent after divorce.1 39 The
couple had entered into a separation agreement providing that the wife
would receive the family residence as her separate property and the husband would receive another home to be purchased shortly thereafter. A
divorce decree incorporating the agreement gave custody of the couple's
only child to the wife and ordered the husband to make periodic support
payments. Less than a year later the father executed a deed of trust covering his new home in order to secure a preexisting commercial debt. The
loan proceeds were not used to purchase, pay taxes on, or improve the
father's property. Because an enforceable lien may only attach to a homestead under those circumstances,14 0 the father brought suit to invalidate
132. Id. at 780 (quoting Sargeant v. Sargeant, 118 Tex. 343, 352, 15 S.W.2d 589, 593
(1929)); see Thompson v. Thompson, 149 Tex. 632, 645, 236 S.W.2d 779, 787 (1951).
133. 623 S.W.2d at 780-81; see Richardson v. McCloskey, 276 S.W. 680, 684 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1925, opinion adopted); Brokaw v. Richardson, 255 S.W. 685, 688 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1923, no writ).
134. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 52; Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Tex. 1978).
135. Zapp v. Strohmeyer, 75 Tex. 638, 639, 13 S.W. 9, 10 (1890); see McKnight, supra
note 30, at 125, n.283.
136. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3833 (Vernon Supp.
1982-1983).
137. See Wierzchula v. Wierzchula, 623 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1981, no writ); Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 623 S.W.2d 462, 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1981, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
138. 630 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1982).
139. Id at 639.
140. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 provides in part:
The homestead of a family, or of a single adult person, shall be, and is hereby
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the deed of trust, asserting that the prQperty was his family homestead.
The trial court found that the property was the father's homestead at the
time the deed of trust was executed and therefore held the instrument invalid. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that the father had failed
to establish the existence of his homestead at the time of divorce.' 4' On
writ of error the supreme court held that the father "had the burden to
prove he had established a family homestead. . . prior to the execution of
the deed of trust."' 42 To sustain this burden the court required evidence
that he was part of a family unit when the property acquired its alleged
homestead character. 43 In reversing the appellate court's opinion that
homestead rights must exist prior to divorce, the court noted that a family
homestead can exist between a divorced spouse and a dependent child
even though managing conservatorship may have been granted to the
other spouse. 44 As long as the child is dependent and the father owes a
duty of support, he is entitled to a homestead as the head of a family. 45
Moreover, the homestead claim is not limited to the spouse who remains
on the original family homestead. The court found that the right derives
from the relationship of the parent to his or her family so that continued
residence by one spouse in the prior family residence does not affect the
other's right to establish an independent homestead elsewhere.' 46 The
court concluded that the father had occupied the home prior to the execution of the deed and that he had the requisite intent to establish a homestead. 4 7 The end result, therefore, was judicial approval of concurrent
family homesteads for the relationship of each parent to the same child.
Mere intention alone will not establish a homestead on property suffiprotected from forced sale, for the payment of all debts except for the
purchase money thereof, or a part of such purchase money, the taxes due
thereon, or for work and material used in constructing improvements thereon
An equitable charge may attach, however, to one spouse's separate homestead in order to
secure the other spouse's right of reimbursement against the property or to secure payment
of spousal indebtedness for the homestead interest awarded on divorce. See McKnight,
supra note 30, at 125. A subsequent lender who discharges a prior lien validly fixed on
homestead property is entitled to be subrogated to the position of the prior lienholder. Leonard v. Brazosport Bank, 628 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982,
writ ref d n.r.e.); cf.First Nat'l Bank v. McClung, 483 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (bank could not indirectly enforce lien and forced sale upon
debtor's homestead); see also Abney v. Powell, Inc., 669 F.2d 348, 349-50 (5th Cir. 1982)
(nature of lienholder's interest in homestead and impact of equity on discharge of judgment
lien on homestead).
141. 626 S.W.2d 318, 319-20 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981).
142. 630 S.W.2d at 639. "Apparently, [the] court [of appeals] was of the opinion that any
homestead rights of a divorced person must have existed prior to the divorce. We disagree."
Id.
143. Id
144. Id.
145. Id The court cited Schulz v. L.E. Whitham & Co., 119 Tex. 211, 217, 27 S.W.2d
1093, 1095 (1930), Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586, 589, 19 S.W.2d 35, 35
(1929), and other authorities as supporting the existence of a family homestead in the possessory conservator.
146. 630 S.W.2d at 640.
147. Id
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cient to insulate it from creditors' claims. In the absence of actual occupancy, some overt act of preparation must accompany actual intent in
order to establish a homestead right. 48 The Corpus Christi court of appeals recently held that the purchase of building materials by a lot-owner
along with the preparation of building plans was sufficiently overt to establish the existence of a homestead on an unoccupied and vacant lot. In
Clark v. Salinas149 the homestead claimant sought to protect a 50- by 135foot lot from a judgment creditor's forced sale. The district court granted a
temporary injunction enjoining execution on the property, and the creditor
appealed. Although the property owner never resided upon, improved, or
utilized the land in any manner, he had purchased construction materials
that he stored at another location. In contemplation of building his own
home, the owner had drawn up structural plans, but an injury had prevented him from beginning actual construction. In view of these facts the
judgment creditor argued "that the absence of any activity on the land
must be equated with an absence of any overt act required for a homestead
claim." 50 The court rejected this argument and determined that the necessary overt act must evidence an intent to occupy the land, not actual
occupation itself. The proof of an overt act, in the court's view, merely
serves "to corroborate the claimant's testimony that he did intend to occupy the property as a homestead."'1' The court perceived no reason that
the proof must relate to activities on the land itself and found the acts
conducted by the lot owner sufficient to establish his single adult homestead.' 52 The few facts that can be elicited from the opinion are consistent
with the outcome, but one must question how overt acts must be in order
to evidence the requisite intent for establishing the homestead. In light of
Clark an owner of unimproved property might arguably insulate his raw
land from creditors' claims by conveniently obtaining building plans and
some construction materials in anticipation of future home building. The
Clark decision espouses a very liberal interpretation of the proof necessary
53
to prove the homestead exemption.
A Houston court of appeals agreed that proof of concurrence of act and
intent on the part of the owner is required to prove homestead use and
added the anachronistic comment that the husband, as head of the family,
must select the homestead.1 54 In a suit to determine ownership of certain
real property, parents brought suit against both their sons and their respec148. See Cheswick v. Freeman, 287 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Tex. 1956); Gilmore v. Dennison,
131 Tex. 398, 400, 115 S.W.2d 902, 902 (1938); McKnight, supra note 30, at 126.
149. 626 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi), writ refd n.r.e per curiam, 628
S.W.2d 51 (Tex. 1982).
150. 626 S.W.2d at 120.
151. Id (citing Vaughan v. Sterling Nat'l Bank & Turst Co., 124 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1938, writ ref'd)).
152. 626 S.W.2d at 120.
153. Cf Bush & Proctor, Piercing the Homestead: The Trial ofan Excess Value Case, 34
BAY. L. REV. 387 (1982).
154. Ellisor v. Ellisor, 630 S.W.2d 746, 747 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [1st. Dist.] 1982, no
writ).
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tive wives. The trial court rendered judgment for the parents and imposed
a constructive trust on that part of the property that one of the sons and his
wife alleged was their homestead. The son and daughter-in-law were subsequently divorced and only the ex-wife appealed, alleging that a portion
of the property was her homestead. Although she was the sole appellant,
the court said that her ex-husband's intent was conclusive as to the homestead designation. 5 5 The appellate court found that the evidence amply
supported the jury's findings that a joint venture relationship existed between the appellant's ex-husband and his father and that he did not intend
the home to be his permanent homestead.' 56 The son and his wife lived
rent-free in a dwelling for which the father paid. The father had bought
the land and had built the house with the father's proceeds from selling
another house. The son had agreed to live in the house only until the
father found a buyer. Any profits were to be divided by the father and the
son. In commenting on the husband's intention and the "settled law" giving the husband the sole right to select the homestead, the court introduced
an entirely extraneous issue into the discussion, which provokes argument
concerning the amendment to the Texas Constitution providing for equality under the law for both sexes. 57 The court should have said that one
cotenant (who is not a surviving spouse) cannot assert a right of homestead
against another without an enforceable agreement that the claimant holds
the right of homestead occupancy. 5 8 It was therefore the father's intention, not the son's, that was relevant in this situation. But because the sonhusband as cotenant asserted no agreement with his father, and the father
implicitly denied any such understanding in bringing his suit, the homestead claim could not be maintained.
Homestead- Exemption in Bankruptcy. Under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code the debtor's property becomes that of the bankruptcy estate
upon commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.' 59 At that point the
debtor has the option of choosing to exempt property, including the homestead, under either the rather restricted list of exemptions enumerated in
section 522(d), 160 or of asserting that the property is exempt under other
federal provisions or applicable state law, unless the state of domicile prohibits such an option.' 6' Texas has taken no action inconsistent with the
155. 1d.
156. Id at 748.
157. Id at 747; see TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a, adopted in November 1972. In Burk Royalty Co. v. Riley, 475 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. 1972), the court had restated the old rule but
hinted that it might not be viable much longer. Id at 569.
158. See Scoggins v. Taylor, 248 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarilo 1952, writ

ref'd).
159. 1i U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. III 1979).
160. Id § 522(d). That section provides a list of eleven types of property that may be
claimed as exempt.
161. Id. § 522(b)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1979); see Dole, The New Federal Bankruptcy Code: An
Overview and Some Observations Concerning Debtors' Exemptions, 17 Hous. L. REV. 217
(1980); Comment, The New Bankruptcy Code.- A Comparison of Texas and Federal Exemptions, 17 Hous. L. REV. 373 (1980). See also Field & Young, The Constitutionality of Bank-
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debtor's right to exercise that option. Texas debtors choosing to use the
state exemption system invoke the protection of articles 3833, 3835 and
3836 to exempt their homestead and other property from administration in
62
bankruptcy.
In bankruptcy proceedings the issue often arises whether the debtor can
sufficiently prove the establishment of the homestead in order to invoke
the protection of the statutory exemption. The debtor bears the initial burden of demonstrating the nature of the property and its use during the
relevant time in order to establish its homestead character.1 63 The homestead laws are liberally construed in favor of the homestead claimant, however, and once he proves those rights the burden shifts to the creditor to
show by clear and satisfactory evidence164 its termination by alienation,
abandonment, or other divestiture.1 65 The question of abandonment is
one of fact, and Texas courts require a showing of departure from the residence with a fixed intention not to return. A number of cases in the bankruptcy court for the northern district of Texas addressed the abandonment
issue and evinced a generally liberal attitude toward granting homestead
protection. One case recognized the continued existence of a homestead
although the co-owners of the property had left the county after their divorce and had leased the property to a third party for over four years.1 66
The court held that the creditor failed to show that the debtor had a fixed
intention not to return. 167 The court was persuaded by the debtor's testimony that he had left because of the lack of employment opportunities but
planned to return when economic conditions improved. 6 8
In In re Hays 169 the court similarly concluded that a married ruraldweller could claim a homestead in rural acreage of not more than two
hundred acres although he did not reside there but had used it to provide
for his family. 170 In Hays the debtor had borrowed money and purported
to put a lien on an undeveloped tract of land located seventy miles from
his rural residence. Although the debtor failed to show overt acts sufficient
to establish a rural homestead for residential use, the court concluded that
recent cases suggested the availability of a rural business homestead if the
claimant were a rural dweller in the same general area.' 7' In invalidating
ruptcy Code § 522(b)(1) and State Bankruptcy Exemptions, or. Does § 522(b)(1) Mean What
It Says?, 36 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 52 (1982).
162. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 3833, 3835, 3836 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).

163. See supra notes 148-58 and accompanying text.
164. See West v. Austin Nat'l Bank, 427 S.W.2d 906, 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1968, writ retd n.r.e.); Anson v. Arnett, 250 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1952, writ refd n.r.e.); see also Norman v. First Bank & Trust, 557 S.W.2d 797, 801 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (proof of new homestead establishes
abandonment as matter of law).
165. See Sullivan v. Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39, 43 (Tex. 1971); Woods v. Alvarado State
Bank, 118 Tex. 586, 595, 19 S.W.2d 35, 38 (1929).
166. In re Floyd, No. 281-00149 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 1982).
167. Id., slip op. at 3.
168. Id.
169. No. 282-00023 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 1982).
170. Id., slip op. at 7.
171. Id, slip op. at 6;see Sims v. Beeson, 545 S.W.2d 262, 263-64 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
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the lien the court held that evidence of clearing, irrigating, and farming the
land, coupled with the expenditure of significant amounts of money in doing so, were sufficient overt acts to exempt the land as a place where the
72
debtor provided for his family.
In In re Orman 173 a single adult claimed rural homestead entitlement to
110 acres. The debtor had resided on the property for nine years, but the
residence was destroyed by fire, causing the debtor and his wife to move to
a rented house in a nearby town. The couple was then divorced. The
debtor lived in the rental property for over five years and was residing
there when the bankruptcy proceeding was commenced. He had continued limited farming on the alleged homestead but derived the majority of
his income from other sources. His intentions to return and rebuild a residence were vague and indefinite, and the judgment creditor argued that
the debtor had clearly abandoned his homestead. The court held, however, that the creditor failed to show that the debtor had a fixed intention
not to return and that merely nominal productivity of the property was
inconclusive. 174 The court granted the homestead exemption for one hundred acres of the tract, the maximum acreage allowed to a single adult
under article 3833. 7 5 When an urban residential and business homestead
are both claimed they must be located in the same urban area. 76 Clearly
then, if one is claiming an urban business homestead without an urban
residential homestead the business homestead must be in the same urban
area as the dwelling place. The analogous rule with respect to a claim of a
rural nonresidential homestead is recognized in In re Hays. 17 7 The difficulty with the conclusion in Orman is that the claimant had become an
urban dweller and had asserted a nonresidential rural homestead contrary
to the rule in Exall v. Security Mortgage & Title Co. '78 But if the claimant
was asserting a rural residential homestead and the trustee was unable to
79
show abandonment, the conclusion is incontestable.
Exempt Personalty. Article 3836 exempts a family's personal property not
in excess of $30,000. 11o This exemption from seizure for the satisfaction of
liabilities extends to tools, equipment, apparatus, and books necessary to
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Cocke v. Conquest, 35 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tex. 1931) (residence normally an element of homestead). The court in Hays allowed the assertion of a
rural business homestead although the debtors did not have a rural residential homestead,analogizing it to cases in which debtors were permitted to claim an urban business homestead without an urban residential homestead. No. 282-00023, slip op. at 6. The court cited
Lewis v. Morrison Supply Co., 231 F.2d 632, 634 (5th Cir. 1956); City of El Paso v. Long,
209 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1947, writ refd n.r.e.).
172. No. 282-00023, slip op. at 7-8.
173. No. 582-000333 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 16, 1982).
174. Id., slip op. at 5-6.
175. For the text of the single adult, rural homestead provision, see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 3833(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
176. Id
177. See supra note 169.
178. 39 S.W. 959 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1897, writ refd).
179. Id. at 960.
180. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3836 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). Related provisions
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the family, as well as certain types of motor vehicles. Under section 522(0
of the Bankruptcy Act, if a debtor has waived his exemptions in favor of
an unsecured creditor, he may avoid a nonpossessory, non-purchasemoney lien that impairs an exemption of "implements, professional books,
81
or tools of the trade."'
The Fifth Circuit in a Louisiana case, In re McManus, I8 2 recently analyzed whether an exemption is allowable for encumbered personal property in this situation. The case consoidated actions of couples who sought
to avoid nonpossessory, non-purchase-money chattel mortgages on certain
household goods and furnishings. The couples sought to invoke section
522(0, but the court held that the debtors must first be entitled to an exemption under section 522(b) as the court interpreted subsection (0 to provide. 18 3 Subsection (b) expressly grants the state the power to allow its
debtors to use either the federal list of exemptions or those provided by
other federal or state law. Because the court found that Louisiana had
chosen to limit its debtors to the state list of exemptions, and because
household goods and furnishings that have been encumbered by a chattel
mortgage are specifically not entitled to an exemption under Louisiana
law,' 84 the debtors were not entitled to the benefits of section 522(0. At
least one bankruptcy court in Texas has noted the similarity of the Louisiana statute to the Texas personalty exemption statute and held that the
Fifth Circuit's holding controls the attempted exemption of Texas personalty under section 522(0).185 Whereas Louisiana law specifically states that
encumbered moveables are not exempt, Texas law merely allows such
86
property to be encumbered without any specific statutory provision.
Following McManus and the literal language of the statute, the court held
in In re Evans 187 that a bankrupt orthodontist could not exempt his validly
encumbered dental or orthodontic tools and equipment nor the cash value
of insurance policies on his life that had been assigned to a lender as colof TEX. TAX CODE

ANN.
GEN. OP. MW-451 (1982).

§ 11.16 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) are construed in TEX. ATT'Y.

181. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0 (Supp. III 1979). It must be emphasized that Texas exempt personalty is subject to encumbrance without any waiver, but the exempt homestead cannot be
encumbered for purposes not enumerated in the Texas Constitution even if the owner or
manager of the property purports to waive its exempt character.
182. 681 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1982).
183. Id at 355. "Significantly, the avoidance provisions of section 522(0 are available to
debtors seeking to avoid a lien only 'to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to
which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b)' of section 522." Id The
dissent argued, however, that the Bankruptcy Code does not grant the states authority to
preempt any subsection of § 522 other than (b), which concerns the exemption. The dissent
reads the majority decision to hold that a state "can by statute preclude a debtor from availing himself of the loan avoidance provisions found in § 522()." Id at 358 (Dyer, J., dissenting); see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (Supp. III 1979).
184. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3885 (West Supp. 1983).
185. In re Evans, 25 Bankr. 105 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
186. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3836(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). The phrase
"except for encumbrances properly fixed thereon" in art. 3836(a) refers to the computation
of the exempt amount and not to this Texas rule.
187. 25 Bankr. at 110.
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lateral. 88 The court can be excused for following McManus because the
Fifth Circuit court itself seems to have been misled by the draftsman of the
federal act. Actually neither Louisiana nor Texas law clearly fits the situation addressed by subsection (f), which seems to be directed to those states
that prohibit encumbrance of exempt personalty but allow waiver of the
prohibition. But if the subsection was meant to avoid non-purchasemoney liens on exempt property generally (as it can be construed to mean
and as the report of the House Judiciary Committee suggests), then the
benefits of subsection (f) should be claimable in both Louisiana and Texas.
Even if the Fifth Circuit court was correct in its analysis of Louisiana law,
the court seemed to leave the way open for reaching a different conclusion
as to Texas law when it said that "[i]f Louisiana had not expressly defined
mortgaged household goods and furnishings out of the list of exempt property, the result would be arguably different."' 8 9 Hence In re Maricle, 190
earlier decided by the same court that rendered the opinion in Evans, is the
preferable holding.
The choice between federal and state exemption systems under section
522 permits each debtor in a joint bankruptcy proceeding to claim exemptions under either system.' 9' In In re Hoeffner 92 the wife chose the federal exemption scheme and the husband sought protection under Texas
law. The court concluded that in light of the Fifth Circuit's decision in In
re Cannady,193 "a debtor-spouse. . . may claim the exemption in the entire community ownership interest in real or personal property" that his
creditors could reach, regardless of the fact that the debtor-spouse owns
only an undivided one-half interest in that property. 94 Hence, because
the wife's creditors can reach community property over which she has sole
or joint management, she can exempt more than her one-half property interest subject only to the dollar limitations placed upon the exemption by
applicable federal law. The court also determined that the husband could
not claim an exemption under Texas law for his wife's current wages and
federal pension. 95 He wanted to do so because his wife had chosen the
federal exemption, but he was precluded because those assets were not
subject to the payment of his debts. Rather, they were community prop188. Id at 108. The court determined, however, that the divorced debtor could claim the
family personal property exemption of up to $30,000, to the extent that it was unencumbered
property, because he had a clear duty to support his minor daughter as possessory conservator and a moral obligation to support his two sons attending universities. He was, therefore,
deemed to be "head of a family" for exemption purposes. Id at 107-08; see Crow v.
Burmeister, 26 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1930, no writ).
189. In re McManus, 681 F.2d at 357.
190. 25 Bankr. 36, 37-38 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
191. 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) (Supp. III 1979); see also In re Maitland, 13 Bankr. 928 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 1981).
192. No. 581-00061 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 1982).
193. 653 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1981); see McKnight, supra note 30, at 127-28.
194. No. 581-00061, slip op. at 2.
195. Id at 3-4.
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erty subject to the sole management of the wife. 196
Article 3826(a)(3) sets out the specific provisions for exemption of motor
vehicles. 197 One court has held that the enumeration of specific types of
travel precludes an exemption claim of similar means of travel as tools of
trade under article 3836(a)(2).19 8 A recent decision took a different tack in
denying an attempt to avoid a lien on a tractor and two cattle trailers on
the grounds that the debtors had leased the vehicles to others, thus making
them lessors of rolling stock. Hence, the vehicles were not "tools, equipment or apparatus" of a trade but only items of leasing inventory. 199 Another bankruptcy decision held that the use of a truck by a mechanicdebtor to transport his tools to and from work was not "a reasonably necessary tool or implement of his trade" entitling him to an exemption from
a nonpossessory, non-purchase-money lien.2°° This interpretation seems
inordinately narrow.
IV.

DIVISION ON DIVORCE

PropertySettlement Agreements. Texas courts encourage settlement agreements to facilitate divorce and the division of marital property. 20' If the
provisions of a valid agreement are not incorporated in the decree, they are
enforceable under general principles of contract law. 20 2 If the settlement

agreement is set forth in the decree or is incorporated by reference and
approved by the trial court, it is accorded the same finality as any other
judgment and binds the parties. 20 3 The settlement terms merge into the
judgment and preclude the parties from raising contractual defenses to en196. Id. at 4; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.22, 5.61 (Vernon 1975). But see In re
Barnes, 14 Bankr. 788 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
197. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3836(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), construed in
TEX. ATr'Y GEN. OP. MW-502 (1982).
198. In re Gavin, No. 74-G-27 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 7, 1975). For a critical evaluation
of Gavin, see McKnight, Family Law. Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33
Sw. L.J. 99, 152-53 (1979).
199. In re Dickerson, No. 281-00148, slip op. at 3 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 1982).
200. In re Maricle, 25 Bankr. 36, 38 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
201. See, e.g., Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. 1967); Mikeska v. Mikeska,
584 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ). On the underlying scope of spousal freedom to change the character of their marital property generally, see
Comment, Amendment to Article XVI § 15 of the Texas Constitution: Greater Uniformity
Among the Community Property States, 21 So. TEX. L.J. 239 (1982); Comment, The Texas
MaritalPropertyAmendment: An Analysis of Its Meaning and Effect, 33 BAY. L. REV. 307
(1982).
202. Deen v. Deen, 631 S.W.2d 215, 216-17 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1982, no writ);
Kennedy v. Kennedy, 619 S.W.2d 409, 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no
writ); Vickers v. Vickers, 553 S.W.2d 768, 769-70 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ);
Boyd v. Boyd, 545 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ);
O'Benar v. O'Benar, 410 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966, writ dism'd); Simpson v. Simpson, 387 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1965, no writ); Eagle Lumber Co. v. Trainham, 365 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1963, writ refd
n.r.e.).
203. McCray v. McCray, 584 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex. 1979); Francis v. Francis, 412
S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. 1967); see McKnight, Family Law.- Husbandand Wife, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 115, 146-47 (1980).
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forcement. 2°4 Inasmuch as the provisions of Family Code section 3.631(c)
seem to allow the court discretion to give contractual alimony provisions
effect, 20 5 those provisions are an exception to the rule of merger because

the court otherwise 2lacks general authority to order post-divorce exspousal maintenance. 06
Two recent cases dealt with decrees incorporating settlement agreements
with contractual alimony provisions entered long prior to the effective date
of section 3.631. In Chess v. Chess2 0 7 the ex-husband discontinued support
payments to the ex-wife required by a property settlement agreement approved by the trial court. Upon suit by the ex-wife to enforce the agreement the husband argued that the wife had breached the contract 2by
08
failing to provide full support for their minor child as they had agreed.
The trial court awarded the full amount of the unpaid contractual support
to the ex-wife, and the appellate court affirmed. 2°9 The court denied the
husband's interposition of a contractual defense and found the action to be
an impermissable collateral attack upon the prior judgment, which required the mother to support the child but not as a condition for receiving
payments of support. 210 In Conner v. Bean 21 ' the ex-wife brought suits for
breach and anticipatory breach of a contractual alimony agreement incorporated in the decree. The court held that the husband's contractual defenses were barred because the making of them amounted to a collateral
attack on the final divorce decree. 21 2 If these conclusions are sound, section 3.631 merely codifies existing principles of law. In Conner the court
also rejected the ex-husband's argument that the contractual duty to pay
alimony allowed termination of payments on subsequent remarriage of the
ex-wife. The court concluded that the settlement was a property division
and that a settlement of a fixed sum in lieu of property rights remains
204. Exparte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1979); Peddicord v. Peddicord, 522 S.W.2d
266 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussedin McKnight, Family Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 86 (1976).
205. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.631(c) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
206. See Myrick v. Myrick, 601 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ);
Tewell v. Tewell, 599 S.W.2d 351, 354-55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
207. 627 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
208. Id. at 515. The agreement provided for maintenance of the ex-wife but did not

include specific child support provisions. The ex-wife was awarded custody of the child and
was required to provide "all necessities and support, including but not limited to educational
expenses of said minor child." Six years later the mother found the child unmanageable and
sent the child to reside with the ex-husband. Id
209. Id at 516.
210. Id In Nagle v. Nagle, 633 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1982), the post divorce dispute had
gone a step further. The parties had composed their differences concerning breach of the
settlement agreement on the basis of an undertaking of one to convey land to the other. But

the agreement to convey was not evidenced by a writing so that it could be enforced. Id at
788-89.
211. 630 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
212. Id at 699. Compare Walker v. Walker, 619 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1981, writ refd n.r.e.) (ex-wife's suit to accelerate payments amounted to collateral attack on
the divorce decree).
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unaffected by the wife's remarriage. 21 3 The court went on to say that payment imposed by an agreement need not be expressly referable to any particular property owned by the parties. 21 4 But if an agreement is to be
construed as a property division, logic seems to require that a provision for
support as an incident of division must refer to the existence of some property to be divided.
Disputes over ownership and beneficial rights in insurance policies often
arise out of property settlement agreements made in a divorce context. In
Gillespie v. Moore 21 5 the former wife sued an insurance company, claiming
the proceeds of her ex-husband's life insurance policy as named beneficiaiy. On divorce the ex-spouses had entered into a property settlement
agreement, incorporated in the divorce decree, that transferred to the husband all interest in a $10,000 life insurance policy. The ex-husband remarried, but failed to change the designation of the ex-wife as beneficiary. In
determining whether the settlement agreement prevented the ex-wife from
receiving the proceeds, the court distinguished ownership rights from
beneficial rights in the policy. The court noted that a spouse can convey
an ownership interest in a policy without necessarily losing the right to
receive the proceeds as the designated beneficiary. 21 6 If, however, the
agreement clearly provides that the spouse is surrendering any claim to the
proceeds as beneficiary, those rights are lost.2 17 The court found that the
language in the property settlement agreement was unambiguous and that
it expressed an intention by the ex-wife to relinquish all ownership and
218
beneficial interest in the policy.
In Teaff v. Ritchey 2 19 both the insured's ex-wife and surviving wife

claimed the proceeds from a $50,000 policy on the life of the deceased
husband. After his remarriage the insured designated his surviving spouse
as the primary beneficiary. In a court-approved property settlement agreement the husband had earlier agreed to take "all personal effects" while
the ex-wife received "all other community property" not expressly given
the husband. The court of appeals held that the phrase "personal effects"
did not include the insurance policies; so the ex-wife received the proceeds
220
as community property under the residuary clause of the agreement.
Because she had sole ownership of the policies, the change of beneficiary
213. 630 S.W.2d at 700; see Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 270, 302 (1956).
214. 630 S.W.2d at 700 (citing Miller v. Miller, 463 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1971, writ refd n.r.e.)). In Cohen v. Cohen, 632 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Ct. App.-Waco 1982, no
writ), the ex-husband filed suit for a declaratory judgment seeking to avoid two provisions of
a property settlement agreement incorporated in a divorce decree. The court held that a
declaratory judgment action is an impermissible collateral attack on a prior judgment and
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action. Id at 173.
215. 635 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
216. Id at 928; see Pitts v. Ashcraft, 586 S.W.2d 685, 695-96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1979, writ refd n.r.e.); Partin v. De Cordova, 464 S.W.2d 956, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1971, writ ref d).
217. 4 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 27.114, at 655 (2d ed. 1960).
218. 635 S.W.2d at 928.
219. 622 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ).
220. Id at 591-92.
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22 1
made by the insured had no effect.
In McDonald v. McDonald222 the ex-husband died in an accident
twenty-five days after the spouses were divorced. In the division of their
marital estate the trial court awarded the husband all interest in insurance
policies arising out of his employment. There were two such policies, and
the ex-wife was the designated beneficiary of both. The husband failed to
change those designations prior to his death. In a contest with respect to
the proceeds, the court noted that Texas law recognizes the right to receive
proceeds payable in the future as a property right in the nature of a chose
in action. 223 When purchased with community funds the chose belongs to
the community, 224 and the proceeds at maturity are also community property unless the designated beneficiary is a surviving spouse, in which case a
gift of the policy rights is presumed to have been intended and perfected
on death. 225 The court, however, noted the "hotly contested" nature of the
of
divorce and concluded that the evidence rebutted the usual presumption 226
gift in the absence of a change in the named beneficiary prior to death.
ex-wife of her
Therefore, the divorce judgment effectively divested the227
then-existing rights in the future proceeds of the policies.

Exercise of Discretion. Trial courts are afforded broad discretion in dividing marital property in a suit for divorce.2 28 An abuse of discretion is only
rarely found on appeal. 229 The property division need not be equal, but
230
some reasonable basis for decreeing an unequal division must be shown.
properly
The trial court must be presumed to have exercised its discretion
23
and only a manifestly unjust division will mandate a reversal. '
221. Id at 592-93; see Partin v. De Cordova, 464 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1971, writ ref'd) (husband awarded insurance policies under "all other community assets"
provision of property settlement agreement).
222. 632 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
223. Id at 638; see Brown v. Lee, 371 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1963) (Texas Supreme Court
reco&nized right to receive insurance proceeds at future but uncertain date as "property" as
provided in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 23(1) (Vernon 1969)).
224. See Pope Photo Records, Inc. v. Malone, 539 S.W.2d 224, 226 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1976, no writ); Givens v. Girard Life Ins. Co. of Am., 480 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex.
Civ. App.- Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
225. Brown v. Lee, 371 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1963).
226. 632 S.W.2d at 638.
227. Id. at 638-39.
228. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); see Tarin v. Tarin, 605
S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ); McKibben v. McKibben, 567 S.W.2d
538 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ). See Comment, Division ofMaritalProperty on Divorce.: What Does the Court Deem "Just and Right"?, Hous. L. REv. 503 (1982).
229. See McKnight, supra note 30, at 140. Appellate courts look skeptically at charges of
trial courts' abuse of discretion. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. 1981); Young v.
Young, 609 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Tex. 1980); McKnight v. McKnight, 543 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex.
1976); Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 173 (Tex. 1975); see Barber v. Barber, 621
S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ); Mogford v. Mogford, 616 S.W.2d 936
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
230. Zamora v. Zamora, 611 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no
writ); Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229, 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no
writ).
231. Musick v. Musick, 590 S.W.2d 582, 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ); Erger
v. Erger, 590 S.W.2d 186, 188 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ dism'd); In re Mc-

SO UTH WESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 37

In Vallone v. Vallone2 32 the trial court divided the couple's estate, which
consisted primarily of corporate stock in a restaurant of which the husband's separate estate owned approximately forty-seven percent and the
community owned the rest. The court valued the business at $1,000,000
and awarded the wife seventy percent of the community stock. The decree
further ordered that the corporation purchase the wife's stock for $77,000
and a note for $300,000 personally guaranteed by the husband. The court
of appeals found that this arrangement constituted a reasonable award to
the wife of 51.4 percent of the community estate as calculated by the court,
but the intermediate appellate court went on to hold that the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to consider in that calculation the large
increase in the value of the husband's separate shares by reason of commu2 33
nity labor.
In a five-to-four decision the Texas Supreme Court reversed the finding
of the court of civil appeals and affirmed the trial court's division of the
marital estate.2 34 In concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ignoring the enhanced value of the corporate shares, the supreme
court rejected the wife's contention that the corporation existed as the alter
ego of the husband and that its assets should therefore be treated as community property. This argument was disposed of on the procedural
ground that the alter ego issue was a question of fact that the appellate
court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate because the trial court had factually
determined the issue. 235 The court also dispensed with the wife's claim of
reimbursement on the procedural grounds of insufficient pleadings.2 36 Finally, the court cited the traditional authorities in support of the trial
court's broad powers of division and the presumption of proper exercise of
discretion.2 37 Although the majority decision did not directly address the
issue, the court implicitly held that the increase in the husband's separate
property attributable to community labor remains the separate property of
238
the husband under Texas marital property law.
The wife in Jensen v. Jensen239 argued that the trial court abused its
discretion in its mischaracterization of the enhanced value of corporate
stock as the husband's separate property and that the trial court's failure to
Curdy, 489 S.W.2d 712, 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ dism'd), rev'd on other
grounds, 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977).
232. 644 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1982).
233. 618 S.W.2d 820, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ granted); see

McKnight, supra note 30, at 141-42.
234. 644 S.W.2d at 460. The court cited Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162

(Tex. 1975), and Goetz v. Goetz, 567 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
235. 644 S.W.2d at 460. The court noted that the alter ego issue was preserved on appeal
as a "greater weight and preponderance of the evidence" point, and thus was a factual determination. Id On the alter ego issue, see also Martin v. Martin, supra notes 46-52.
236. Id at 459; see infra notes 332-39 for a discussion of the reimbursement issue in the
Vallone decision.
237. 644 S.W.2d at 460 (citing Murffv. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1981); Eggemeyer v.
Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977); McKnight v. McKnight, 543 S.W.2d 863 (Tex.
1976)).
238. See Justice Sondock's dissent, 644 S.W.2d at 460.
239. 629 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ).
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characterize property as community constituted reversible error. The appeals court agreed, but added that the spouse who makes that assertion
must prove that "the trial court would have made a different division if the
property had been properly characterized. ' '24° The appellate court concluded, however, that by characterizing the enhanced value of the stock in
question as separate property, the trial court awarded the husband almost
five times as much community property as it awarded the wife. Accordingly, the appellant satisfied her burden of proof, and the court held that
the disproportionate division constituted an abuse of discretion. 24'
Other appellate courts have rejected the assertion that the trial court
abused its discretion in dividing marital property in suits for divorce. In
Baker v. Baker 242 the ex-husband complained that the trial court's division
of the parties' property was unjust. The court cited the Texas Supreme
Court holdings in Young v. Young 24 3 and Murif v. Murff2 " for the proposition that a trial court may consider fault in making a property division.
The trial judge in Baker had before him jury findings of cruelty by both
parties, but the judgment recited insupportability as the basis of the divorce. The appellate court held, however, that the trial court had the discretion to consider both cruelty and the husband's mishandling of
community property in dividing the estate of the parties.245 Similarly, the
Forth Worth court of appeals found no abuse of discretion in Stephens v.
Stephens246 when the trial court refused to reopen the divorce proceeding
to allow the wife to introduce evidence relative to community property
accumulated during the eight months between oral pronouncement of divorce and the date of final judgment. 247 The appellate court also held that
the trial court properly disregarded the value of the goodwill of the husband's professional practice despite the fact that the wife had worked so
that her husband could pursue his education and make a start in busi240. Id at 225, see Smith v. Smith, 620 S.W.2d 619, 625 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981,
no writ).
241. 629 S.W.2d at 226; see Copeland v. Copeland, 544 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ) (cause remanded due to erroneous classification of spouse's
retirement benefits as separate property); see also In re York, 613 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ) (trial court abused its discretion because property division
made on basis of erroneous classification). But see Spiller v. Spiller, 535 S.W.2d 683, 684-85
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ dism'd) (error in characterization of property as community rendered harmless by award of it to appellant).
242. 624 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
243. 609 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. 1980).
244. 615 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1981); see McKnight, supra note 30, at 141; see also Horrigan
v. Horrigan, 635 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ).
245. 624 S.W.2d at 798. Shortly before the parties' separation the husband had sold 20%
of his company's assets worth more than $130,000 to his relatives for $3,000. He also closed
the company for the two years prior to the date of the divorce. Id
246. 625 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
247. Id at 430-31. The court held that the reopening of the case to receive additional
evidence was a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. Further, the wife had waived
her right to appeal the exclusion of additional evidence by failing to request the trial court to
reopen the proceedings and by neglecting to specify which evidence would be established if
the court should permit further hearing. Id
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ness. 248 Nor did the trial court err in considering the wife's civil service
249
retirement benefits in making the property division.
In Campbell v. Campbell 250 the Fort Worth court of appeals concluded
that an award of more than $80,000 of the community to the wife and
$3,500 to the husband, who also was ordered to pay the wife's $20,000
attorneys' fees, did not constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial
judge. 25' The court noted that the large separate estate of the husband,
coupled with his ownership in a profitable business, justified the trial
court's disparate division of the estate. 252 The court added the dubious
observation that the order granting temporary alimony pending appeal of
the decree was interlocutory and thus not appealable. 253 The court then
qualified its decision by stating that even if the order were appealable, it
was within the trial court's authority to grant temporary support under
254
section 3.59 of the Family Code.
In Janik v. Janik255 a Houston court of appeals affirmed a trial court's
award granting more than $49,000 to the wife and approximately $22,700
to the husband. The court awarded the community home to the wife and a
retirement fund to the husband, and the husband asserted that he was unfairly burdened with the greater share of the liabilities. The appellate
court, however, concluded that the trial court had acted reasonably in ordering that each debt follow the asset that secured it and that each party
discharge one-half of the income tax liability. 256 Further, in light of the
husband's greater earning capacity, the court found no manifest unfairness
in the division of assets. 257 In In re Read25 8 the Amarillo court of appeals
indulged "every reasonable presumption in favor of a proper exercise of
'25 9
discretion by the trial court in dividing the properties of the parties.
248. Id at 431; see Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972) (goodwill accrued in husband's medical practice not properly divisible on divorce); see also Freed & Foster, Family
Law in the Fifty States.- An Overview, 16 FAMILY L.Q. 289, 300-11 (1983); Comment, Identifying, Valuing, and Defning Professional Goodwill as Community Property at Dissolution of
the Marital Community, 56 TULSA L.J. 313 (1981).
249. 625 S.W.2d at 431.
250. 625 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ dism'd).
251. Id at 43.
252. Id The husband had a separate estate of approximately $1,000,000. Moreover, the
wife had been hospitalized several times for alcoholism and was unemployed because of her
drinking problem. Id ; see also Hausler v. Hausler, 636 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Ct. App.-Waco
1982, no writ) (no abuse of discretion in trial court's speculation as to future income of
spouses).
253. 625 S.W.2d at 44; cf. Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 624 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Ct. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ) (order dividing marital estate held to be final judgment
and appealable).
254. 625 S.W.2d at 44; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.59 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). But
see Belz v. Belz, 638 S.W.2d 158, 159 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ) (temporary
order of spousal support made after perfection of appeal).
255. 634 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1982, no writ).
256. Id at 325.
257. Id
258. 634 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1982, writ dism'd).
259. Id at 345 (citinq Thompson v. Thompson, 380 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1964, no wnt)); see also Leal v. Leal, 628 S.W.2d 168, 169-70 (Tex. Ct. App.San Antonio 1982, no writ) (presumption that trial court considered allegations of husband's
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The court affirmed the trial court's award to the wife of the community
property portion of a ready asset account in which community property
and the wife's separate property had been commingled, assuming that the
trial court considered the mixed nature of the account in making its
260
division.
The trial judge's appointment of a receiver to distribute and divide the
marital estate was held to be an abuse of discretion in Whitehill v.
Whitehill.26 1 The judgment provided that a receiver would be appointed
to divide the community personalty through an alternating property selection process. The court of appeals found that the process of division was to
be conducted without judicial approval after entry of the decree, and thus
held that the judgment was in violation of the mandatory provision of
Family Code section 3.63 requiring the trial court to order a property division. 26 2 Moreover, the court noted that a receiver should be appointed
263

only when "reasonably necessary for the preservation of the property.
The appointment of a receiver to file the ex-spouses' tax returns and to sell
their residence, two activities that were properly the rights of the parties,
an abuse of discretion requiring reversal of the lower
thus constituted 264
court's decision.

Divestiture of Separate Property. The principle seems finally settled that
the trial court's broad discretion to divide the marital estate on dissolution
does not extend to divesting one spouse of title to separate property,
26 s
whether realty or personalty, and transferring it to the other spouse.
The Texas Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the holding in favor of
nondivestiture of separate personalty in Cameron v. Cameron.266 The
court did so, however, by way of obiter dictum and affirmed the trial
court's division of federal savings bonds acquired in common-law jurisdictions with the husband's earnings. The lower appellate court had held that
the bonds were the husband's separate property and, therefore, under Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 2 67 could not be divested upon divorce. 26 8 The wife
dissipation of community funds in making property division); Hourigan v. Hourigan, 635

S.W.2d 556, 557 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ) (presumption that trial court considered circumstances of parties in division of property in absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law).
260. 634 S.W.2d at 345-46.
261. 628 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston 114th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
262. Id at 150; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
263. 628 S.W.2d at 151.
264. Id
265. See Fitts v. Fitts, 14 Tex. 443 (1855) (fixing trust on wife's separate personalty,
which was given to her by her husband, for husband's maintenance does not violate rule that
separate property should remain with its original owner on divorce); see also Campbell v.
Campbell, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 391 (June 7, 1980), withdrawn, 613 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. 1980)
(nondivestiture rule applied to separate personalty); Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d
137 (Tex. 1977) (nondivestiture rule applied to separate realty).
266. 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1982). Prior to the decision in Cameron, however, the Dallas
court of appeals held tenaciously to the contrary view. See Whittington v. Whittington, 638
S.W.2d 92, 93-94 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ dism'd).
267. 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977).
268. 608 S.W.2d 748, 751 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ granted). Contra
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asserted that Eggemeyer should be overruled and that separate personalty
should be treated differently from separate realty. For the court Justice
states the law in Texas on nondivestiPope held that Eggemeyer correctly
269
ture of separate personalty.
The court observed that article XVI, section 15 of the Texas Constitution provides the exclusive definition of separate property, and to allow a
court to transmute such separate property of one spouse into the separate
property of the other would be an unconstitutional enlargement of that
definition. 270 Second, the court said the power of the court to order a "division of the estate of the parties" under Family Code section 3.63 refers
only to the community property of the spouses and inferentially prohibits
divestiture of separate property. 27 ' Further, the use of the term "division"
impliedly excludes the divestiture of separate property. The court also rejected the contention that divestiture was permissible under the state's police power, because the legislature has consistently failed to assert such an
intention in its legislative reform of section 3.63.272 The court found that
the Texas policy against post-divorce ex-spousal support does not sustain
the majority refused to grant it in the absence of legislative
divestiture, and
273
authorization.
After extending the Eggemeyer holding to include separate personalty,274 the court addressed the fact that the property in question was ac-

quired in common-law states and was characterized as separate property
by the appellate court. The supreme court pointed out that the Texas Constitution precludes division of separate property acquired during marriage
by gift, devise, or descent. Hence the constitution does not prohibit the
division of property that is termed "separate property" elsewhere, but
which is acquired in the same manner as community property is acquired
in Texas.275 The court therefore concluded that the trial court's division of
non-Texas "separate property" does not constitute an unconstitutional takhe
ing because the acquiring spouse loses no more in a Texas divorce than 276
would lose under a common-law state's equitable distribution law.

Coote v. Coote, 592 S.W.2d 52, 55-56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(Hughes, J., dissenting) (separate personalty interests acquired in common-law state are not
separate property under Texas Constitution and hence are properly divisible upon divorce).
269. 641 S.W.2d at 213-19.
270. Id at 213; see TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
271. 641 S.W.2d at 214-15;see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
272. 641 S.W.2d at 215-16.
273. Id at 218-19.
274. In his concurrence Justice McGee would have refused to extend the holding in Eggemeyer to the divestiture of separate personalty. Because the entire court concluded that
savings bonds acquired in common-law states were not "separate property" in the constitutional sense, the concurring opinion considered the comments on Eggemeyer as mere obiter
dicta. Further, Justice McGee disagreed with the majority's construction of the statutory
language "estate of the parties" and asserted that § 3.63 permits a division of separate and
community property. Moreover, the concurrence asserted that Eggemeyer's exclusive definition of separate property was an incorrect explication of the Texas Constitution. Id. at 22328 (McGee, J., concurring).
275. Id at 220.
276. Id at 222-23; see Berle v. Berle, 97 Idaho 452, 546 P.2d 407, 409 (1976) (state court
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Thus, the court judicially adopted the principles of section 3.63(b) enacted
at the 1981 legislative session and precluded any argument that these prin27 7
ciples violate the due process provisions of the Texas Constitution.
In McLemore v. McLemore27 8 the trial court awarded to the wife the
title to a home the husband's parents had purchased and had conveyed to
the spouses as a gift. The Tyler court of appeals cited several decisions
holding that a gift by a third person to both spouses vests each marital
partner with a one-half undivided interest in the property, each half characterized as separate property. 279 Thus, divesting one spouse of separate
real property and awarding it to the other spouse constituted a prima facie
abuse of discretion by the lower court. 280 In a somewhat more complicated fact situation another court erred in an analogous case. In Maxie v.
Maxie28s the court rejected the husband's assertion that he had been
divested of his separate property when his wife was awarded the home
purchased prior to marriage. The husband, in contemplation of marriage,
purchased a home twenty-six days before marriage and made a down payment of $800, to which the wife-to-be contributed $300 of her separate
property. The property was conveyed to the husband while single. The
court found that because the wife invested her separate funds in the property when the property was purchased, a purchase-money resulting trust
had been created for her benefit.2 82 That conclusion, however, does not
negate the fact that the property was substantially the husband's separate
property from inception of title. The husband's prior representation that
recognized rights of spouses to equitable division of common-law separate property upon
divorce).
277. 641 S.W.2d at 221-22. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)
reads:
(b) In a decree of divorce or annulment the court shall also order a division of the following real and personal property, wherever situated, in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard to the rights of each
party and any children of the marriage:
(1) property that was acquired by either spouse while domiciled elsewhere and that would have been community property if the spouse who acquired the property had been domiciled in this state at the time of acquisition;
or
(2) property that was acquired by either spouse in exchange for real or
personal property, and that would have been community property if the
spouse who acquired the property so exchanged had been domiciled in this
state at the time of its acquisition.
See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; Sampson, Interstate Spouses, Interstate Property and Di'orce, 13 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1285 (1982); Comment, The Division of MaritalProperty Upon
Divorce and Quasi-Community PropertyLaw in Texas: The Texas LegislatureAmends Section
3.63 of the Family Code, 23 So. TEX. L.J. 139 (1982).
278. 641 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ).
279. Id at 397; see Bradley v. Love, 60 Tex. 472 (1883); see also White v. White, 590
S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1979, no writ); King v. Summerville, 80
S.W. 1050 (Tex. Civ. App.), aft'd, 98 Tex. 332, 83 S.W. 680 (Tex. 1904). Though this line of
cases rests in presumed intention of the donor, the rule precluding a gift to the community is
elsewhere said to rest on the constitutional definition of separate property in terms of gift.
Kellett v. Trice, 95 Tex. 160, 169, 66 S.W. 51, 54 (1902).
280. 641 S.W.2d at 398 (citing Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977)).
281. 635 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1982, writ dism'd).
282. Id at 177.
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the funds invested would be used to purchase a marital homestead was
carried out. The wife had283an interest in the property proportionate to her
initial $300 contribution.
Military Retirement Benefits. After the United States Supreme Court held
in McCarty v. McCarty2 8 4 that military retirement benefits cannot be divided on divorce pursuant to state community property law, a great many
disputes arose due to cessation of payments, and in new cases the courts
were beset by difficulty in applying the federal Supreme Court's guidelines. As months passed following the McCarty decision, it was rumored
that Congress would pass an act to relieve the problems McCarty had
caused. Finally, on September 8, 1982, the President signed the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, effective February 1,
1983.285 A new era of confusion had begun.
From the day on which McCarty was decided, June 26, 1981, to the
enactment of the congressional bill, the courts devoted much attention to
pre-McCarty decrees and McCarty's effect upon them. Although the Fifth
Circuit had applied the doctrine of res judicata to a final pre-McCarty
judgment dividing military benefits in Erspan v. Badgett,286 in a post-divorce partition suit the Texas Supreme Court in Trahan v. Trahan287 refused to divide military retirement benefits left undivided on divorce.
Because no prior judicial decree had dealt specifically with division of the
benefits, 28 8 the court concluded that the principle of res judicata was inapplicable to the situation before it. Hence, the supreme court denied an
award of accrued and anticipated benefits to the ex-wife in reliance on
McCarty and the principle of federal supremacy. Because the case was on
appeal at the time McCarty was decided, the court in Trahan held that no
final judgment on the merits had been rendered, and the McCarty decision
therefore had the immediate effect of precluding any further partition of
military retirement benefits by a state court.2 89 The court distinguished the
283. Id. at 177-78. The court distinguished Villarreal v. Villarreal, 618 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ), in which the court refused to characterize a home
purchased prior to marriage as community property. In Villarreal, however, the wife failed
to contribute anypart of the down payment, unlike the wife in Maxie. See also Swearingen
v. Swearingen, 578 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1979, no writ)
(where $6,000 down payment on married couple's home was paid with gift from husband's
father, and judgment gave husband $6,000 reimbursement, court did not divest husband of
separate property), discussed in McKnight, supra note 203, at 148.
284. 453 U.S. 210 (1981); Note, Military Retirement Pay Not Subject to Division as Community Property Upon Divorce.- McCarty v. McCarty, 34 BAY. L. REV. 335 (1982); see Mattern v. Mattern, 624 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ). But whether
other types of federal benefits are divisible depends on the particular language of congressional enactments. See Anthony v. Anthony, 624 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin
1981, writ dism'd) (federal workers' compensation benefits received in lieu of federal Civil
Service Disability Retirement Funds were divisible).
285. Pub. L. No. 97-252, §§ 1001-1006, 96 Stat. 730 (1982).
286. 659 F.2d 26, 28 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1443, 71 L. Ed. 2d 658 (1982).
287. 626 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. 1981); see McKnight, supra note 30, at 144-45.
288. The decree, however, effectively created a tenancy in common in property that had
been undivided community.
289. 626 S.W.2d at 487-88.
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Fifth Circuit's application of res judicata in Erspan as involving a suit to
enforce a prior unappealed divorce decree that divided the husband's military retirement benefits. 290 Trahan, on the other hand, was an appeal from
a judgment partitioning previously undivided benefits and was not, therefore, a final adjudication having a res judicata effect. 29'
The post-McCarty habeas corpus cases considered by Texas courts indicate an inconsistent application of the res judicata doctrine to a final judgment that has previously awarded military benefits to the nonmilitary
spouse. In Exparle Buckhanan 292 one panel of the San Antonio court of
appeals held that McCarty allowed a relator to attack a divorce decree
collaterally through a habeas corpus proceeding. 293 The court found that
under the supremacy clause the federal statutory scheme, designed to provide military retirement pay, preempted the trial court's power to divide
such pay and rendered the judgment void. 294 Conversely, another panel of

the same court refused to give the McCarty decision full retroactive effect
in ExparteRodriguez.295 In that case an ex-husband was held in contempt
for failure to comply with an agreement incorporated in his divorce decree
that entitled his wife to a percentage of his military retirement pay. The
agreement placed the "total retirement entitlements" in trust and designated the husband as the trustee. The ex-husband ceased making payments. In a habeas corpus proceeding seeking relief from a contempt
commitment, he argued that the effect of McCarty was to render the divorce order void or unenforceable. The court denied his application for
the writ and held that McCarty should not be accorded full retroactive
290. Id Erspan involved a suit to enforce a 1963 divorce decree awarding the wife one-

half of the husband's military retirement benefits. Sitting en banc, the Fifth Circuit held that
the divorce decree was a final unappealed judgment to be given a res judicata effect. 659
F.2d at 28. Further, the court found no suggestion in the McCarty decision that the
Supreme Court intended to upset prior valid state court judgments dividing military pay.
The Fifth Circuit's decision allows trial courts to deny retroactive effect to McCarty in favor
of giving a res judicata effect to prior final divorce judgments. See Kahn, McCarty Revsited-Its Repercussions Continue to Echo, 16 TRIAL LAW. F., April-June 1982, at 11, 12;

Raggio & Raggio, McCarty v. McCarty. The Moving Target of Federal Pre-emption Threatening All Non-Employee Spouses, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 505, 514 (1982).
291. See Moore v. Jones, 640 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ), in
which an ex-wife was denied a partition of increases in her husband's military retirement
pay. The court held that the prior divorce decree constituted a final adjudication of the
amount being paid at the time of divorce. Citing Trahan, the court said that although no
final adjudication regarding the increases was made, McCarty necessarily precluded the division of any future increase in military benefits. Id at 393-94; see also In re Grant, 638
S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1982, no writ) (McCarty precluded division of military retirement benefits pursuant to divorce decree that has not become final).
292. 626 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
293. Id. at 68.
294. Id; see Exparte Johnson, 591 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. 1979) (division of Veterans Administration disability benefits by state court held void because of preemption by federal statute); see also Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 439 (1940) (state courts' attempts to exercise
jurisdiction over preempted subject matter are "nullities and vulnerable collaterally"); Ex
parte Acree, 623 S.W.2d 810, 811-12 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ) (relator held not
in contempt and divorce decree-dividing military benefits held void under Buckhanan).
295. 636 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
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effect. 296 In its analysis the court found that McCarty did not meet the
retroactivity standards articulated by the Supreme Court in an earlier decision. 29 7 Moreover, the McCarty rationale did not mandate a retroactive
application
that would have a "devastating" effect on the stability of fam298
ily law.
Several appellate courts followed the lead of the court in Rodriguez and
have refused to apply McCarty to invalidate prior final divorce judgments
that divided military retirement benefits. In Exparte Gaudion299 the Austin court of appeals declined to follow Buckhanan. The court held that a
final divorce judgment was collaterally unassailable in a habeas corpus
proceeding and was protected by the doctrine of res judicata. 3°° In Ex
parte Hovermale30° the San Antonio court of appeals expressly disapproved its earlier decision in Buckhanan and held that McCarty was not to
be given retroactive effect in order to relieve the ex-husband of his obligation to pay his former wife military retirement pay. 30 2 The court concluded that retroactive application of McCarty "would affect the objectives
of Congress only minimally, compared to the potentially destructive effect
upon the settled jurisprudence of our State. ' 30 3 In rejecting writs of
habeas corpus in Rodriguez and Gaudion without opinion, the Texas
Supreme Court seems to have avoided a logical extension of its curious
conclusion in Trahan.304
In McCarty the Supreme Court effectively held that the military retirement system preempted the application of a state's community property
law to divide military retirement benefits upon divorce. 30 5 The Supreme
Court then held in Ridgway v. Ridgway 3°6 that federal law under the Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Act (SGLIA) preempted inconsistent
state law, thus allowing the insured service member to designate a beneficiary and to alter that choice without notice to any prior beneficiary. 30 7 The
imposition of a constructive trust by state law in favor of the insured's
children was inconsistent with the SGLIA's anti-attachment provision, and
the ex-husband was therefore able to circumvent the terms of the divorce
decree ordering him to hold the policies for the benefit of his children. 30 8
296. Id at 848.
297. Id

The court agreed with Justice Klingeman's dissent in Buckhanan and cited

Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), as controlling precedent on the issue of
retroactivity.
298. 636 S.W.2d at 849.
299. 628 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982, no writ).
300. Id at 502-03.
301. 636 S.W.2d 828, 836-37 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
302. Id at 836-37.
303. Id at 836; see also Ex parte Forderhase, 635 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler
1982, no writ); Exparte Welch, 633 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1982, no writ);
Balazik v. Balazik, 632 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
304. See Ray, Recent Family Law Decisions of the Texas Supreme Court-1981-82, 82 ST.

B. NEWSLETTER

FAM.

L. 8, 10-11 (1982).

305. 453 U.S. 210, 233 (1981).
306. 454 U.S. 46 (1981).

307. Id at 55-56.

308. Id at 60; see Kahn, supra note 290, at 17-18.
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But in Ryan v. Ryan 30 9 the Beaumont court of appeals held that the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act did not preempt
did not prohibit division of a pension
state law under McCarty and thus
310
and retirement plan on divorce.
Congressional enactment of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses'
Protection Act authorizes state courts to divide military pension benefits
on divorce in accordance with local property law. 31 1 Under the Act a state
court may treat nondisability disposable military retirement or retainer
funds payable to a member for pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981,
either as the sole property of the service member or as the property of both
spouses pursuant to the law in the state court's jurisdiction. 31 2 A court
may consider retirement pay as divisible property only if the court has
jurisdiction over the member because of his residence (other than military
assignment in the jurisdiction) or because the member is domiciled in the
jurisdiction or consents to jurisdiction. 31 3 The bill does not create any
right or interest that can be "sold, assigned, transferred, or otherwise disposed of," including disposition through inheritance, by a spouse or exspouse. 314 The act entitles a spouse to receive direct payments from the
military for court-awarded alimony, child support, and division of property if the spouse or former spouse was married to the military member
during at least ten years of service. 31 5 Direct payments, however, can comprise no more than fifty percent of the military member's retirement or
3 17
retainer pay. 3 16 The effective date of the act is February 1, 1983.
It was apparently intended that the Act apply to final orders entered
prior to the McCarty decision. The Act, however, does not recognize subsequent modifications to the decree made in response to the holding in
McCarty or to the enactment of the federal statute. Payments to the nonmilitary spouse, therefore, should be made pursuant to the decree in effect
at the date of the McCarty decision, June 26, 1981.318 The Acts provisions
will also apply to court orders made after the McCarty decision. PostMcCarty final divorce decrees that treat military retirement benefits as
separate property of the service member are, nevertheless, likely to be
3 19
given full effect.
309. 626 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
310. Id at 105.
311. Pub. L. No. 97-252, §§ 1001-1006, 96 Stat. 730 (1982).
312. Pub. L. No. 97-252 § 1002(a), 96 Stat. 730 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1)
(1982)).
313. Id (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(4) (1982)).
314. Id (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(2) (1982)).
315. Id (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(2) (1982)).
316. Id (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(1) (1982));see aso id (to be codified at 10
U.S.C. § 1408(e)(4)(B) (1982)).
317. Id § 1006(a) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408 note).
318. H.R. REP. No. 749, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1569, 1571.
319. Although the draftsmen of the Act seem to have assumed that all divorce decrees
are subject to modification, final post-McCarty divorce decrees that treated military retirement benefits as the separate property of the service member are not subject to modification
under Texas law. A nonmilitary spouse, therefore, might attempt to set aside the final judg-
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Little has been said about the Act's application to suits tried after its
effective date. The broadest interpretation of the Act is to treat it as providing that military retirement benefits should be dealt with as though McCarty was not decided. 320 At the other extreme, section 1408(c)(1) can be
construed literally to mean that "a court may treat disposable retired or
retainer pay. . . for pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981, [only]...
as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of
the jurisdiction of such court."'32' By that reading all benefits accrued
prior to June 26, 1981, are treated as not subject to division and subject to
the McCarty decision with a community interest accruing for each month
of married service thereafter. In the context of a pre-McCarty order the
Supreme Court of Texas adopted a middle ground in Cameron v. Cameron .322 The divorce decree had awarded the wife thirty-five percent of
the retired husband's present and future benefits. Because the court construed the Act to limit any division of the pay to periods beginning after
June 25, 1981, it affirmed the trial court's award for thirty-five percent of
the payments, but only for payments accruing after that date. 323 Because

several months' time may elapse between the date of a final order and the
time required by the military services to process the order for direct payments, the order should require the service member to make the payments
until direct payments commence.
Reimbursement. The equitable right of reimbursement of the community
estate for community funds expended for the benefit of a spouse's separate
property does not amount to an interest in the property. 324 The Dallas
court of appeals followed this rule in Anderson v. Gil/iland,325 holding that
a husband's quitclaim to his wife of any right he might have in the wife's
separate property was ineffective to convey his future equitable right of
reimbursement for one-half of the community funds he expended on his
wife's separate property. 326 In Anderson the wife, as executrix of her deceased husband's estate, refused to include as an asset in the husband's
estate his right of reimbursement for community funds he had used to improve the value of the wife's separate realty. The wife claimed that an
earlier quitclaim the husband had executed transferred to her the reimment by bill of review. It is doubtful, however, that the proponent could allege and prove a

meritorious defense (e.g., the Supremacy Clause and preemption) to the cause of action.
For a thorough analysis of the Act's effect on divorce decrees, see Sampson & Friday, McCarry Redux. Construing the UniformedServices Former Spouses ProtectionAct, 82-3
L., Fall 1982, at 7.

ST.

B.

SEC. REP. FAM.

320. Id
321. Pub. L. No. 97-252 § 1002(a), 96 Stat. 730 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1)
(1982)).
322. 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1982).
323. Id Some question exists whether the court's analysis of the Act was accurate. See
Sampson & Friday, supra note 319, at 7-10.
324. See Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561, 564-65 (Tex. 1964); Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex.
305, 316-17, 83 S.W.2d 620, 627 (1935).
325. 624 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
326. Id. at 244.
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bursement right. The court concluded that the right of reimbursement was
"only a claim for money and return of funds and not a right, title, or interest in the land. ' 327 Moreover, a matured right of reimbursement arises
only upon dissolution of the community. Thus, the execution and delivery
of the quitclaim during the existence of the community estate conveyed
of
nothing to the wife because the grantor had neither a matured right
328
equitable reimbursement nor a transferable interest in the property.
In Ervin Y. Ervin329 the Eastland court of appeals held that a quitclaim
executed by an ex-wife after the spouses had separated released the wife's
claim to reimbursement for the enhancement in value of the husband's
separate estate from community funds and efforts, although it did not
change the character of the property. 330 The quitclaim deed conveyed to
the husband all "right, title, and interest" in his separate real estate and
recited that the husband would assume all indebtedness, including an
$11,000 debt entered into by both spouses. On a motion for rehearing the
Eastland court disagreed with the Dallas court's approach in Anderson and
held that because the parties were separated when the quitclaim was executed, the wife's claim for reimbursement was "sufficiently matured to
constitute a claim against appellee's land and that the claim was released
by the quitclaim deed. '3 31 While the conclusion in Anderson seems unassailable, the difference in the two opinions may be attributed to the interpretation of the two deeds' different language.
Although the supreme court in Vallone v. Vallone 3 32 characterized certain shares in the family corporation as separate, the court noted that such
a characterization did not necessarily preclude the right to reimbursement
for appreciation in value of those shares. 333 The court further held that the
right "arises when community time, talent and labor are utilized to benefit
and enhance a spouse's separate estate, beyond whatever care, attention,
and expenditure are necessary for the proper maintenance and preservation of the separate estate, without the community's receiving adequate
compensation. '334 This is a significant departure from the intimation of
the court in Norris Y.Vaughan335 that an owner is entitled to expend a
reasonable amount of nonreimbursable time on separate property to make
327. Id (quoting Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Tex. 1964)).
328. 624 S.W.2d at 244; see Lott v. Lott, 370 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex. 1963) (quitclaim
conveys presently owned interest in land). In a vigorous dissent, Justice Stephens disagreed
with the majority's strict construction of the form and language of the quitclaim deed and
found that the circumstances of the conveyance suggested an intention by the grantor to
release and extinguish all present and contingent claims against the grantee. 624 S.W.2d at
248.
329. 624 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1981, writ dism'd).
330. Id. at 267 (citing Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1964)).
331. 624 S.W.2d at 268.
332. 644 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1982); see 3 0. SPEER, TExAs FAMILY LAW § 22.38 (5th ed.
1976).
333. 644 S.W.2d at 458.
334. Id at 459.
335. 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676 (1953).
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it productive. 3 36 The claimant of a right of reimbursement bears the burden of pleading and proving that the expenditures and improvements were
made and are properly reimbursable. 337 In her pleadings the wife in Vallone prayed for equitable relief if community funds or property were used
to enhance the value of the husband's separate property without adequate
compensation to the community. The trial court had found that the profits
from the restaurant were used to benefit the spouses' community estate.
The wife failed to plead that the community was entitled to reimbursement
due to time, talent, and labor expended by the husband. The court concluded that failure to plead reimbursement specifically premised upon
338
these grounds amounted to waiver of any equitable relief in that regard.
Because the right was effectively waived, the court held that the lower
339
court's failure to consider the matter did not constitute reversible error.
Attorneys' Fees. Although no specific statutory authority expressly mandates an assessment of attorneys' fees against either spouse in a divorce
proceeding, such fees may be awarded under the court's equitable power
to divide the parties' estate in a manner that is just and fair. 340 Attorneys'
fees are considered as a factor in making an equitable division of the community, taking into account the conditions and needs of the parties as well
as the surrounding circumstances. 34' Texas courts have recognized that
the practical effect of a decree ordering one spouse to pay attorneys' fees
may be to award that spouse less of the community estate than the other
342
spouse.
The award of attorneys' fees is within the discretion of the court. 343 A
prerequisite to such an award is proof that the amount sought is reasonable. 344 In Leal v. Lea 345 the court held that the reasonableness of
336. Id. at 495-98, 260 S.W.2d at 678-80.
337. 644 S.W.2d at 459; see Wachendorfer v. Wachendorfer, 615 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ); West v. Austin Nat'l Bank, 427 S.W.2d 906 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
338. 644 S.W.2d at 459-60 (citing Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561, 567 (Tex. 1964);
Wachendorfer v. Wachendorfer, 615 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1981, no writ); Gaston v. Gaston, 608 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no
writ); Pruske v. Pruske, 601 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ dism'd)).
339. 644 S.W.2d at 459.
340. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); see Carle v. Carle, 149
.Tex. 469, 474, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1005 (1950); In re Read, 634 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. Ct.
App.-Amarillo 1982, writ dism'd).
341. See Murffv. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. 1981); Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469,
474, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1005 (1950).
342. Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 474, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1005 (1950); see also Mendoza v.
Mendoza, 621 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ) (award of $ 1,000 in
attorneys' fees affirmed despite no indication in record that they were considered in making
property division).
343. See Farrell, Proofof Court-AwardedAttorneyFees in Texas Courts, 45 TEX. B.J. 857
(1982).
344. See Fambro v. Fambro, 635 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no
writ) (award of attorneys' fees rests within sound discretion of trial judge); Treadway v.
Treadway, 613 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ dism'd) ($5,000 attorney fee bears reasonable relationship to amount in controversy). See McKnight, Division of
Texas MaritalProperty On Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 413, 455-61 (1976).

345. 628 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
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attorneys' fees is a question of fact that must be supported by competent
evidence and may be determined by a jury. 3 4 6 In that instance the court
reversed the award of $3,000 in attorneys' fees after an examination of the
record revealed no proof of the reasonableness of the fees. The court severed the claim for attorneys' fees and remanded the case, noting that the
trial court
retained the discretion to award attorneys' fees upon proper
47
3

proof.

Enforcement. If one party bound by a divorce decree fails to discharge his
or her duties pursuant to it, the court may exercise its contempt powers in
order to enforce the judicial order. To hold a person in contempt for disobeying a court order, the decree must articulate the details of compliance
in "clear, specific and unambiguous terms so that such person will readily
know exactly what duties or obligations are imposed upon him. '34 8 In Ex
parte Smiley 349 the relator brought a habeas corpus proceeding after being
held in contempt for failure to pay his former spouse a part of his military
retirement benefits. The court held that the contempt and commitment
order was void because the order of the divorce court merely awarded the
wife "[aill of the military retirement benefits monthly check accrued in the
name of Benjamen Smiley," who was in turn ordered to do nothing. The
contempt order was similarly nonmandatory in its terms. 350 The court further found that the contempt order not only fined the relator in excess of
the statutory limits but also made no distinction between the amount owing to the ex-wife for arrearages and the amount of the penalty owed to the
state. 35 ' Resort to the divorce decree was futile because it suffered from
the same infirmities of ambiguity and equivocation as the contempt order.
In Ex parte Tarpley352 the relator sought a writ of habeas corpus after
being adjudged in contempt for failure to provide temporary alimony. In
March 1981 the trial court entered a temporary order requiring the husband to pay alimony pendente lite "until further order" of the court. In
July 1981 a trial on the merits was held, and in November the wife filed a
motion for contempt. In the habeas corpus proceeding the husband as346. Id. at 170. Some appellate courts had previously held that the reasonableness of

attorneys' fees is not a jury question, but a matter entrusted to the trial judge that can be
adjudicated without the benefit of evidence. See, e.g., American Income Life Ins. Co. v.
Davis, 334 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, no writ); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v.
Woodyard, 206 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1947, no writ). These holdings were
disapproved irn
Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Britton, 406 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. 1966).

347. 628 S.W.2d at 170-71. For a discussion of the severability of claims for attorneys'
fees, see Uhl v. Uhl, 524 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ); Schecter v.

Folsom, 417 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, no writ).
348. Exparte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Tex. 1967).
349. 626 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
350. Id. at 818-19; see Exparte Duncan, 42 Tex. Crim. 661, 670-71, 62 S.W. 758, 760

(1901) (for court to punish for disobedience of order, such order must "speak definitely the
meaning and purpose of the court in ordering").
351. 626 S.W.2d at 818; see TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1911(a), § 2(a) (Vernon

Supp. 1982-1983).
352. 636 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1982, no writ).
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serted that at the trial on the merits the judge orally awarded a divorce to
the parties and took under advisement the prospective division of property. The husband contended, therefore, that the pronouncement of divorce was a "further order" relieving him of his temporary support
obligation. Although no record was made of the judgment, the appellate
court held that the husband conclusively established that the trial court did
in fact make a pronouncement of divorce, 353 which constituted a further
order terminating the husband's obligations under the prior temporary order. 354 The order was merely interlocutory, 355 however, and not final as
356
the court seems to suggest.
Post-Divorce Claims. In Cohen v. Cohen 357 a trial court in January 1975
rendered a judgment of divorce, and no appeal was taken. Almost six
years later the ex-husband brought a declaratory judgment action in an
attempt to hold void two provisions concerning property in the divorce
decree. The husband asserted that the award of ten percent interest exceeded the allowable interest on judgments under Texas law and that the
provision allowing a floating principal amount, based upon a cost of living
index, was void as a deprivation of property without due process. The exwife filed a plea in bar, arguing that the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act
forbade the use of a declaratory judgment as a remedy against a prior
judgment. The Waco court of appeals held that the use of a declaratory
judgment action was a collateral attack on a prior judgment and could not
be used to compel a trial court to interpret the judgment. 35 8 The court
might have added that the remedy sought went considerably beyond an
interpretation. The only ground for a collateral attack on an unappealed
judgment that is regular on its face is that the rendering court had no per359
sonal, subject matter, or competency jurisdiction.
Eleven years after a divorce decree was rendered, the ex-wife in Jacobs
v. Cude360 brought suit seeking to partition the ex-husband's retirement
benefits. The trial court granted the husband summary judgment and
found the cause of action barred by res judicata. The divorce decree contained a residuary clause providing that the husband would receive all
community property not specifically mentioned in the decree, but made no
353. Id at 23.
354. 636 S.W.2d at 23 (citing Leone v. Leone, 543 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-

mont 1976, no writ), which was a case of final judgment, however).
355. In re Johnson, 595 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, writ ref'd n.r.c.); see
also McKnight, Family Law.- Husband and Wfe, Annual Survey of Texas Law 33 Sw. L.J.
99, 122-23 (1979); McKnight, supra note 99, at 122-23; McKnight, Family Law: Husbandand
Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 105, 110, 118 (1977).
356. 636 S.W.2d at 23 (citing Leatherwood v. Holland, 375 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.), rev'd, 597 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. 1980)).
357. 632 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Ct. App.-Waco 1982, no writ).
358. Id at 173; see Sutherland v. Sutherland, 560 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Speaker v. Lawler, 463 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1971, writ refd n.r.e.).
359. 632 S.W.2d at 174; Hardin v. Hardin, 597 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1980); Austin Indep.
School Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1973).
360. 641 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
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express reference to the ex-husband's retirement benefits. The court of appeals held that the cause of action was properly barred by the lower court's
decree and that the retirement benefits were included by inference in the
residuary clause. 36' The court refused to allow the appellant to "collaterally 'chip away' at the ownership status of property already adjudicated by
'36 2
[the] court.
In First NationalBank v. Dyes 363 a divorced wife who had been awarded
shares of stock pursuant to a divorce decree sought to compel the issuer
and its stock transfer agent to transfer those shares and all accrued dividends to her. The trial court held that the ex-wife was entitled to the
shares under Texas Business and Commerce Code section 8.317.364 The
judge ordered the issuer and its agent to issue a new certificate in the wife's
name and further ordered the husband to relinquish control of his stock
certificate. The appellate court reversed the lower court decision and held
that section 8.317(b) provides no right to the issuance of a new certificate
when the old certificate has not been reduced to possession by a public
officer or by the issuer. 36 5 Because neither the issuer nor the stock transfer
agent was the owner or holder of the old stock certificate, the trial court
erred in compelling the issuance of a new certificate and the cancellation
366
of the old one.

361. Id at 259-60; see Bloom v. Bloom, 604 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1980, no writ) (residuary clause in divorce decree disposing of all property not otherwise
mentioned constituted adjudication of ownership in retirement benefits).
362. 641 S.W.2d at 260; see Austin Indep. School Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878
(Tex. 1973).
363. 638 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1982, no writ).
364. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.317 (Vernon 1968).
365. 638 S.W.2d at 959.
366. Id at 960.

